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This dissertation addresses several open issues in the economics surrounding the use of
nonlinear pricing. The first chapter empirically examines the impact of the use of nonlinear
pricing by wholesalers. The second chapter evaluates how firm profit depends on the number
of prices offered in a nonlinear price schedule. Finally, the third chapter investigates the use
of all-unit discounts as a price discrimination instrument.
The first chapter exploits a unique data set of price schedules to provide the first em-
pirical estimate of the welfare impact of second degree price discrimination in a market with
double marginalization. Theoretical predictions in such a context are ambiguous. Quantity
discounts at the wholesale level reduce costs for larger retailers, increasing efficiency. Ho-
wever, quantity discounts raise input costs for smaller retailers, increasing prices consumers
may pay. The combined welfare effects on consumers depends on how much of input cost
discounts are passed through to consumers and the distribution of retailer size. I develop
and estimate a model of the New York State retail liquor market where wholesalers offer a
multi-part nonlinear tariff for each product. The structural model is then used to estimate
vi
the welfare impact of restricting wholesale pricing to be linear. I find that banning quantity
discounts reduces total welfare by approximately 14% on average. Consumer surplus and
wholesaler profit decline by approximately 26% on average. Average retailer profit increa-
ses by a similar magnitude, though effects for a particular retailer are heterogeneous across
retailer size.
The second chapter examines the shape of observed price schedules more directly. Sel-
lers often offer price schedules with relatively few segments rather than completely nonlinear
price schedules which offer a unique price for each unit sold. By not offering a completely
nonlinear, sellers are foregoing some additional profit in favor of a simpler pricing strategy.
I find that the scale of these foregone profits is relatively small and only loosely related to
product characteristics. When considered in percentage terms, foregone profits are very si-
milar across a large number of products. This suggests that simple pricing strategies obtain
almost all the profits available and this is a common property of nonlinear pricing strategies.
The final chapter compares price discrimination through two different quantity dis-
count mechanisms: all-unit discounts and incremental discounts. All-unit-discounts give
consumers a lower marginal price on all units purchased once total purchase size crosses
a threshold. Incremental discounts only provide discounts on units above the threshold.
Relative to incremental discounts, all-unit-discounts imply higher marginal prices and bun-
ching of purchase sizes in equilibrium. The equilibrium bunching may present a challenge
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Chapter 1
Upstream Quantity Discounts and Double
Marginalization in the New York Liquor Market
1.1 Introduction
The welfare impacts of second degree price discrimination1 in an oligopoly setting
are not well understood. This is true in both final goods markets as well as in the case I
study, intermediate input markets. For intermediate goods markets, the welfare conclusions
depend on the responsiveness of the final demand to price, the nature of competition in the
final goods segment, and on the degree of heterogeneity of firms using the intermediate good
as an input.2 Given that the theoretical predictions hinge on these market characteristics,
the impact of allowing or not allowing second degree price discrimination must be assessed
empirically. However, lack of sufficiently detailed data on nonlinear tariffs has precluded
much empirical work on second degree price discrimination in intermediate goods markets.
Thus, little is known about the implications of such nonlinear pricing strategies in these
markets. This paper seeks to address this gap.
1Second degree price discrimination is defined as a mechanism whereby consumers self select among a
menu of prices. This is distinct from first degree price discrimination, where the seller charges exactly
the buyer’s willingness to pay, and third degree price discrimination, where the seller uses an observable
characteristic of the buyer to charge different prices to different groups. See (Tirole 1988) §3 for more
discussion of various forms of price discrimination.
2Appendix A provides a simple numerical example exploring these issues further.
1
Specifically, I evaluate the welfare consequences of wholesale quantity discounts in an
intermediate goods market. Quantity discounts, where higher purchase volumes result in a
lower per unit price, are a common form of second degree price discrimination. The setting I
examine is the wholesale distribution of liquor in New York State. The state liquor regulator
allows wholesalers to set nonlinear price schedules in quantities. Retailers who purchase a
single case of liquor will pay more per bottle than retailers who purchase more cases of the
same liquor from the same wholesaler. Retailers are heterogeneous because of income or
other demographic attributes of their customers. Downstream heterogeneity on willingness
to pay allows wholesalers to increase profit by offering these menus of tariffs.
As mentioned, one of the difficulties in examining the impact of upstream nonlinear
pricing is the lack of nonlinear tariff information. I overcome that challenge by collecting a
data set containing detailed pricing data from New York State. Liquor wholesalers in New
York State operate under a “post and hold” system where they are mandated by law to
report prices for the following month at the beginning of each month for every product they
offer. I collect these reported price schedules from every month for 2009 through 2013. More
than 2,000 price schedules are reported monthly. This data set is unique in that it details
price schedules for many different products over a long time horizon. I match these price
schedules to downstream retail purchases from the Nielsen Homescan Panel. The Nielsen
data provides individual level purchase decisions and demographic characteristics. The retail
purchase information covers the same time span as the price schedule data.
In this paper, I develop a structural model of wholesaler second degree price discri-
mination and exploit the rich data available on price schedules to estimate the supply side
parameters including wholesaler marginal cost and the distribution of retailer heterogeneity.
2
The model consists of three components. First, wholesalers that set a quantity discount
schedule for each product. Second, retailers that take the wholesale price schedules as given
and set prices faced by consumers. Finally, consumers that observe retail prices and make
purchase decisions.
Rather than offering a completely nonlinear schedule, where each case is offered at a
unique price, wholesalers offer multi-part tariffs. These multi-part tariffs are a series of price
and quantity bands where price per unit is piece-wise constant within that quantity band.
This feature is common to all the price schedules described in my data. These multi-part
tariffs are common across industries; examples can be readily found in industrial supplies,3
office supplies,4 and the financial sector.5
An innovation of this paper is to consider these multi-part tariffs as an equilibrium
object and incorporate the optimal design of the tariffs into the approach used to recover the
parameters of the structural model. The number of price segments, the prices themselves,
and the quantity cutoffs all vary across products. Likewise, there is variation within a
product across time. Further, this variation does not appear to be strongly related to product
characteristics such as spirit type, import status, or bottle size.
I implement an approach that exploits the detailed nature of the price schedule data
and recovers the supply side parameters from the shape of the price schedules. My approach
relies on moment inequalities implied by the profit maximization choices of the wholesaler.
I recover the parameters of the structural model by comparing profits under the observed
3www.fastenersuperstore.com/ offers multi-carton discounts for a wide array of fasteners and screws.
4www.uline.com offers per unit discounts on many common office, janitorial, and safety supplies.
5(Copeland and Garratt 2015) detail a nonlinear price schedule for settling financial accounts.
3
price schedule with perturbations of that price schedule. I evaluate the impact of wholesaler
second degree price discrimination by comparing model implied welfare under the observed
price schedule to the counterfactual single price.
I find that banning quantity discounts decreases wholesaler profits as expected, incre-
ases retailer profits on average, and decreases consumer surplus. All three components are of
similar magnitude. Thus, total welfare is reduced by removing quantity discounts. Welfare
losses are larger for products with more heterogeneous downstream demand.
For wholesalers and retailers, the welfare consequences of banning price discrimination
are similar to those seen in final goods contexts. Wholesalers always see a profit loss from
being unable to price discriminate (this is a general proposition, see (Tirole 1988) §3). The
effect on retailers depends on their size. Retailers who benefited from quantity discounts see
input costs increase and profit losses, while the remaining retailers see the opposite. Effect
magnitudes generally increase as the distribution of retailers becomes more heterogeneous.
These conclusions are in line with those from the theoretical literature on the effects of price
discrimination in a final goods context.
The impact on consumers comes through changes in retail prices. While many re-
tailers see input cost declines after banning second degree price discrimination, the largest
retailers see input cost increases and thus increase their prices. This raises the average retail
price paid by consumers. The change in retailer prices is crucial to understanding the total
welfare impacts of removing the upstream quantity discounts.
This paper is related to a long theoretical literature evaluating the impacts of price
discrimination. Much of the theoretical work has been in final goods contexts, but the
4
intuition provided in those settings can be helpful. This theoretical literature also serves
as the basis for the structural model I develop. (Spence 1977) provides an early theoretical
consideration of nonlinear pricing in a final goods market and derives predictions similar to
the effects I find between wholesalers and retailers. Price discrimination increases profits
for the seller (the wholesaler in the current context) and low value buyers see higher prices
and lower consumption while high value buyers see discounts and increased consumption.
(Katz 1983) examines nonlinear pricing in a final goods market and finds that the profit
maximizing nonlinear price schedule distorts market consumption downward relative to the
welfare maximizing schedule. (Maskin and Riley 1984) provide a comprehensive theoretical
treatment of nonlinear pricing in a monopoly final goods context. They develop important
technical conditions such as the single crossing property to ensure the presence of nonlinear
pricing and derive theoretical results such as consumption being undistorted except for those
consumers with the maximum marginal valuation (i.e. no distortion at the top). (Mussa
and Rosen 1978) develop a similar framework for examining nonlinear pricing in quality
and derive analogous predictions. (Wilson 1993) provides a comprehensive discussion of
nonlinear pricing theory.
While the intuition and technical developments from a final goods context might be
helpful, the present paper is concerned with an intermediate goods market. In such settings,
the theoretical predictions are less clear. (Katz 1987) examines the impact of third degree
price discrimination in an intermediate goods market in the context of the Robinson Patman
Act and finds that allowing discrimination leads to higher input prices for all firms, lowering
overall welfare. (O’Brien and Shaffer 1994) examine a similar context allowing firms to
bargain over input prices and finds the opposite effect; that wholesalers being able to set
5
different prices across firms can lower input prices for all firms and thus increases welfare.
(Inderst and Shaffer 2009) present another theoretical discussion of the impacts of third
degree price discrimination with two part tariffs in an intermediate goods market. They
conclude that allowing the upstream firm to price discrimination increases welfare when
they are allowed to offer simple two part tariffs. The current paper differs from this previous
theoretical literature in that it explicitly considers second degree price discrimination in an
intermediate goods industry and seeks to measure the welfare consequences empirically.
This paper is also the first to directly assess the impacts of wholesale quantity dis-
counts on welfare. Previous empirical work on nonlinear pricing has been focused in final
goods markets and examined the impact of other forms of nonlinear pricing. (McManus 2007)
evaluates the impact of nonlinear pricing on product characteristics and finds nonlinear pri-
cing distorts consumers away from their preferred product characteristics. (Nevo, Turner
and Williams 2016) considers the welfare impacts of usage based pricing (another form of
nonlinear pricing that offers a menu of free allocation, speed, and unit price) in the resi-
dential broadband market. They find that consumer surplus declines under usage based
pricing, though total welfare increases. (Crawford and Yurukoglu 2012) examine the im-
pact of unbundling television channels and find declines in consumer surplus but increases
in overall surplus. Though not the main focus of the paper, (Villas-Boas 2009) infers the
presence of price discrimination from differences in markups and examines the impact of a
uniform markup. She finds that overall welfare increases when price discrimination is elimi-
nated. (Grennan 2013) examines price discrimination in a bargaining context and finds that
uniform pricing may decrease overall welfare, though it depends on the nature of the bargai-
ning. These papers highlight that the empirical effects of banning price discrimination likely
6
depend on market-specific factors as well as the nature of the price discrimination. This
further emphasizes the point that modeling the multi-part tariffs seen in the data directly is
important for any empirical conclusions.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature studying a variety of economic is-
sues in alcohol markets. (Conlon and Rao 2015) evaluate the effect of Connecticut’s post
and hold law on retail prices and consumption. (Cooper and Wright 2012) and (Saffer
and Gehrsitz 2016) compare the effects of post and hold regulations across multiple states.
(Miravete, Seim and Thurk 2017) examine the relationship between tax rates and tax reve-
nue in the regulated Pennsylvania liquor market. (Aguirregabiria, Ershov and Suzuki 2016)
consider partial deregulation and entry of private retailers in the Ontario wine market.
(Seim and Waldfogel 2013) consider the impact of retail liquor store entry in Pennsylvania.
(Ashenfelter, Hosken and Weinberg 2015) find evidence of efficiency gains in the national
beer market form the merger of Miller and Coors. (Asker 2016) evaluates the effect of ex-
clusive distribution arrangements in the Chicago beer market. This paper differs from this
previous work on alcohol markets in that it considers the impact of nonlinear pricing at the
wholesaler (distributor) level.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives relevant industry background infor-
mation. Section 3 describes the data used in estimation. Section 4 describes the structural
model in detail. Section 5 covers estimation and recovery of the supply side parameters.
Section 6 presents estimation results and recovered structural parameter values. Section 7
considers the counter factual simulation of banning second degree price discrimination in the
wholesale segment. Section 8 concludes.
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1.2 Industry Background
In order to evaluate the welfare effect of prohibiting upstream second degree price
discrimination, this paper considers wholesale discounts in the New York State liquor market.
The primary feature of the liquor industry is that it is divided into three distinct tiers:
distillers, wholesalers (or distributors), and retailers (i.e. package stores). The three tier
structure is common across states and is not unique to New York. However, in New York, all
three tiers are private industry (as compared with so-called control states like Pennsylvania
or New Hampshire). In general, agents cannot belong to multiple tiers.6 The practical
implication of this regulation is that retailers and wholesalers can be treated as separate
agents in the modeling process with no threat of merging.
Another relevant aspect of the liquor market in New York State is the lack of chain
liquor stores as regulation prohibits an individual from owning more than one retail liquor
license. This effectively prohibits the formation of chain retail liquor stores.7 Additionally,
liquor is unavailable in supermarkets. Therefore, consumers must go to a dedicated retail
store to purchase liquor. These two effects together limit the negotiating power of any
particular retail store with wholesalers. The implication for the model is that retailers will
treat wholesale prices as given (as opposed to engaging in a bargaining process).
New York State also prohibits co-op buying at the retail level. That is, retail stores
cannot band together to purchase a large amount of liquor and then divide it among them-
selves. This prevents retailers from coordinating to take advantage of quantity discounts.
6New York State Alcohol Beverage Control Law §101
7There appear to be small “chains” in practice. These seem to consist of separate licensees who engage
in co-branding at the retail store level. The difficulty of coordinating decisions across a large number of
individuals keeps the size of these limited.
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Therefore, in the model, each retailer will be treated as making separate purchase decisions.
Finally, New York State has a “post and hold” law. Wholesalers are required to
report their wholesale price schedules to the regulator on a monthly basis. Wholesalers are
then required to adhere to these price schedules for the following month. The effects of post
and hold regulation in Connecticut have been investigated by (Conlon and Rao 2015). Their
setting is different in that Connecticut does not allow quantity discounts while New York
does.8 The post and hold regulation in New York is relevant because the “post” requirement
means that the data is available to the relevant agents (i.e. retailers and wholesalers) and
the researcher. The “hold” requirement means that wholesale prices are fixed for a given
month. From the point of view of the retailer, this means that input costs are (relatively)
fixed over a month. The fact that wholesalers are bound to these price schedules for a month
also precludes the possibility of bargaining over wholesale prices.
Conlon and Rao argue that the post and hold system serves as a coordination me-
chanism for wholesalers. This stems from the fact that in Connecticut wholesalers are given
a grace period after the initial posting to adjust their prices downward to match any com-
petitor’s prices.9 New York’s post and hold law has a similar provision. Conlon and Rao
go on to argue that the ability to see and then match competitor’s prices results in the
wholesalers coordinating to the monopoly wholesale price. Similar intuition should apply
here, though the pricing space is more complicated. New York wholesalers are able to post
a price schedule, see their competitors’ schedules, and then revise. The practical result is
8See Connecticut Agencies Regulations 30-6-A29(a) and New York State Alcohol Beverage Control Law
§101.
9Conlon and Rao have the advantage of seeing both the initial and revised schedules. My data includes
only the final schedules.
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that the modeling will abstract from competition between wholesalers.10
1.3 Data
There are two primary classes of data that are used in the empirical part of this paper.
The first is the wholesaler data which consists of the posted price schedules. The second is
the retail demand data, which provides retail prices and purchase data.
1.3.1 Wholesale Data
If the goal is to understand the welfare impact of banning wholesale second degree
price discrimination, it is important to understand the features of the quantity discounts
that are offered. I collected a rich dataset of wholesale price schedules covering 2009-2013.
The wholesale data originates from the New York State Liquor Authority (NYSLA), the
industry regulator. The information was gathered through a freedom of information request.
A non-machine readable version of the data is available on the NYSLA website.11
The descriptive statistics presented below serve to highlight that these price schedules
look similar to those predicted by the theory of second degree price discrimination. (Wilson
1993) presents a framework for multi-part tariffs which look similar to those seen in the data.
Further, the nature of the price discrimination is not related to observable characteristics of
the products (except perhaps the prices which are likely related to downstream demand for
those products). Wholesalers appear not to follow a rule of thumb or offer the same price
10Considering competition between wholesalers offering nonlinear prices is a difficult open problem.
(Rochet and Stole 2002) and (Armstrong and Vickers 2001) examine oligopoly price setting behavior with
nonlinear pricing and conclude that such problems are only tractable under strong simplifying assumptions.
11https://www.sla.ny.gov
10
schedule for many different products.
Figure 1.1 presents examples of two price schedules. These examples are typical of
the price schedules offered and suggest that wholesalers are trying to capitalize on retailer
heterogeneity. The overall shape of the price schedules in Figure 1.1 are block declining
tariffs, containing multiple price segments. Further, there are a finite number of segments
in each tariff, suggesting that wholesalers are unable to fully exploit retailer heterogeneity.
The above price schedule for Tanqueray has five segments (i.e. is a six part tariff) while
the schedule for Svedka has three segments (i.e. is a four part tariff).12 Also note that
the quantity cutoffs differ across the products. Finally, the Svedka schedule exhibits larger
changes between the prices offered while the Tanqueray schedule is more gradual in its
changes.
Each brand and size combination has a price schedule reported monthly. For example,
there are separate price schedules for Tanqueray in 1L and 1.75L bottles in addition to the
price schedule presented in Figure 1.1. Price schedules are defined at approximately the
same level as a UPC, which is the level at which the retail sales data is available. This
enables the linking of particular retail demand data to a particular price schedule. While
the price schedule and UPC definitions are essentially the same, there is no way to link the
records directly. The price schedule information contains no UPC identifier requiring the two
datasets to be hand matched. Defining price schedules at this level generates an enormous
number of price schedules each month, another unique aspect of this dataset. Table 1.1
12By definition, an N part tariff consists of N − 1 price options. Throughout the rest of the discussion the
terms part and option will be used interchangeably unless the distinction is important.
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Example Price Schedules, Price per Case in April 2015
Tanqueray, 750ml (left) Svedka, 750ml (right)
The price per case for Tanqueray 750ml is on the left. The price per case for Svedka 750ml is on
the right.
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presents the total number of price schedules posted monthly over the entire sample period.13
There are roughly 2,500 schedules posted monthly and the number posted is relatively stable.
Table 1.1: Number of price schedules posted per month.
Year Month Total
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2009 1,612 1,377 2,463 2,461 2,608 2,578 2,589 2,521 2,577 2,587 2,608 2,594 28,575
2010 2,508 2,589 2,588 2,558 2,614 2,675 2,559 2,595 2,595 2,715 2,695 2,728 31,419
2011 2,611 2,719 2,891 2,802 2,859 2,856 2,238 2,208 2,287 2,293 2,345 2,373 30,482
2012 2,316 2,290 2,374 2,372 2,437 2,319 2,549 2,580 2,580 2,702 2,722 2,686 29,927
2013 2,647 2,707 2,607 2,731 2,679 2,723 2,833 2,754 2,762 2,916 2,950 2,958 33,267
The following tables present descriptions of the various segments of the price sche-
dules. The data is broken down by the total number of segments available (i.e. by 2-part,
3-part, 4-part, etc. tariffs). Table 1.2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and median of
each price option. Table 1.3 presents the same information on the cutoff quantities. These
tables consider all price schedules denoted in cases from 2009-2013. The conclusion to draw
from these tables is that there is substantial variation within a particular segment as well
as across segments. Further, prices of a particular segment depend on the total number
of segments offered. On the quantity side, while the medians appear similar, there is still
important variation around that median.
In addition to variation in the prices across segments and by total number of seg-
ments, prices of particular segments are related to observable product characteristics. Table
1.4 presents the results of a regression relating prices to observable product characteristics
13This table and all following tables are for price schedules denoted in cases. These are typically more
popular products (in the sense of brand recognition). The other option is to denote the price schedule in
bottles. These typically are more expensive scotches or specialty liquors.
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Table 1.2: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses), and median price for each option by
total number of options
Total Schedule Option












Obs. = 52,594 132.62 121.00 112.05
4
175.72 163.02 154.10 142.96
(144.70) (137.62) (132.55) (125.78)
Obs. = 33,552 147.00 133.50 125.89 116.67
5
193.92 182.44 174.07 165.05 154.57
(99.38) (93.59) (89.64) (85.70) (82.47)
Obs. = 16,644 168.16 159.08 152.04 143.45 132.84
6
203.05 192.34 184.55 176.54 167.59 157.46
(111.38) (107.23) (102.86) (98.85) (95.41) (93.61)
Obs. = 6,376 181.00 173.92 165.21 156.02 144.00 135.00
7
201.28 189.98 183.35 177.00 169.64 162.03 154.72
(91.88) (86.60) (83.99) (81.38) (79.93) (76.88) (75.52)
Obs. = 1,647 174.95 164.50 159.00 151.35 140.00 134.96 130.65
8
158.76 148.73 142.66 136.54 128.87 118.41 96.19 71.03
(39.92) (38.71) (37.03) (36.10) (38.94) (46.15) (104.47) (173.20)
Obs. = 367 147.60 140.22 133.50 129.99 120.99 114.99 110.00 106.50
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Table 1.3: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses), and median cutoff quantity for each
option by total number of options.
Total Schedule Option












Obs. = 33,552 2.00 5.00 10.00
5
5.11 7.81 13.73 28.17
(22.52) (22.08) (23.05) (30.37)
Obs. = 16,644 2.00 5.00 10.00 25.00
6
4.13 7.12 13.17 24.58 50.51
(18.35) (18.05) (25.60) (20.55) (42.95)
Obs. = 6,376 2.00 5.00 10.00 20.00 35.00
7
2.60 5.25 10.53 20.30 37.60 72.05
(3.14) (4.39) (8.39) (10.93) (23.96) (60.77)
Obs. = 1,647 2.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 29.00 50.00
8
3.06 5.43 10.32 20.20 33.71 64.96 88.70
(0.96) (1.31) (2.61) (12.73) (18.72) (70.58) (52.31)
Obs. = 367 3.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 25.00 50.00 100.00
Note: Cutoff quantities are the minimum purchase required to get the price associated
with that segment. The first cutoff quantity is always zero by definition as there is
no minimum purchase quantity given.
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controlling for which segments offers that price and total segments in the price schedule.
Bottle size and spirit type are important determinants of price while proof is not. There also
appears to be little to no seasonality in prices. The supply side parameters will be recovered
product by product to control for these factors.
Table 1.4: Effect of Product Characteristics on Schedule Prices
Variable Coef. (SE) p-value
1L 43.32 (0.52) 0.00
375ML 15.58 (0.65) 0.00
750ML 47.73 (0.49) 0.00
Proof 0.00 (0.01) 0.70
Gin -48.96 (0.90) 0.00
Liqueur -43.40 (0.80) 0.00
Rum -51.77 (0.76) 0.00
Scotch/Whiskey/Bourbon 8.55 (0.68) 0.00
Tequila -33.43 (1.03) 0.00
Vodka -57.59 (0.69) 0.00
Constant 156.09 (1.44) 0.00
Controls for Option Y
Controls for Total Options Y
Controls for Month Effects Y
This table shows the results of a regression of price sche-
dule prices on product characteristics. All prices regard-
less of segment are included. The regression controls for
the segment of the particular price as well as the total
segments offered.
1.3.2 Retailer Data
The strategy for understanding the welfare impacts of the quantity discounts offered
by the wholesalers relies on developing a model to evaluate welfare with and without the
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quantity discounts. To capitalize on the unique nature of the price schedule data, the focus
of the modeling and analysis will be on the wholesaler nonlinear pricing problem. Consumer
demand is an input to that model. In contrast to the quality and extensive nature of the
price schedule data, the retail sales data available to estimate consume demand is more
limited. The goal is to find a reasonable representation of consumer demand that captures
the relevant features given the limitations of the data.
The source of the retail data is the Nielsen Homescan Panel. The Nielsen Homescan
Panel (hereafter the NHP) is a nationally representative sample of consumers. There are
roughly 3,000 panelists annually in New York State, with approximately 800 consumers
in New York City. Consumers are required to track all their purchases while they are in
the panel. This consumption journal provides detailed information on every purchase a
consumer makes.14 Capturing all purchases by consumers is important as liquor is not sold
in supermarkets in New York, excluding the product category from traditional scanner data
sets.
Given the highly differentiated nature of liquor brands, the relatively small purchase
amounts reported each month suggest that it may be unlikely to see small market-share
products in a given month. Table 1.5 presents the number of purchases reported by panelists
each month. Panel members purchase between 7,300 and 8,500 bottles annually. There
appears to be some variation in total purchases across months with December and the
summer months representing substantial increases over surrounding months.
With a relatively small number of purchases made each month, demand estimation
14Generally this is confined to goods with UPCs. There is marginal information on non-UPC goods such
as produce.
17
will focus on the 250 most popular products among the most common sizes of 375ML, 750ML,
1L, and 1.75L bottles.15 The top 250 products represents approximately 65% of bottles sold
over the 2009-2014 time period among these sizes. Table 1.6 shows the breakdown of the
top 250 products by spirit type.
Table 1.5: Liquor Bottle Purchases by Month
Year Month Total
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2009 608 561 636 574 692 607 731 680 644 554 706 1,079 8,072
2010 547 502 543 506 662 616 686 647 540 545 634 965 7,393
2011 591 453 474 542 597 707 714 625 496 561 679 1,049 7,488
2012 630 540 618 619 788 886 892 813 573 527 566 1,014 8,466
2013 478 495 665 567 744 780 797 727 493 522 620 861 7,749
2014 509 507 598 601 710 773 901 750 550 524 610 738 7,771
Total 3,363 3,058 3,534 3,409 4,193 4,369 4,721 4,242 3,296 3,233 3,815 5,889 46,939
This subsample may vary in systematic ways from all products. Further, as noted
above, only a subset of the most popular products will be able to be hand matched to
corresponding price schedules. Table 1.7 presents summary statistics for each group. Note
that the most popular products are similar in most dimensions except bottle size, with
the largest bottle size being more common than among all products. The hand matched
subsample appears similar to the top 250 products, though it appears to under represent the
375ML bottle size.
In addition to the purchase and product information, the NHP provides demographic
data on the panel members. Information on race, age, education level, and employment are
15The other common bottle size excluded from this list is 50ML bottles. These bottles are extremely small
and likely serve to target a different market which is cash constrained.
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Table 1.6: Products by Spirit Type









This table covers the 250 most
popular products over 2009-2014.
The “Other” liquor category corre-
sponds to liqueurs, brandy, and ot-
her such products.
Table 1.7: Average Product Characteristics
Characteristic All Products Top 250 Matched
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Price 20.38 12.43 20.08 10.65 21.27 8.99
Proof 73.99 17.88 76.61 14.84 77.00 12.21
Imported 0.36 - 0.37 - 0.35 -
375ML 0.11 - 0.10 - 0.01 -
750ML 0.20 - 0.09 - 0.08 -
1L 0.24 - 0.22 - 0.24 -
1.75L 0.44 - 0.59 - 0.67 -
The “Matched” products represent 1,148 products hand ma-
tched to price schedules for 2011.
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provided for all household members. Table 1.8 presents summary statistics regarding the
income levels for all panel members in New York State and New York City in 2009-2013.16
The relatively high fraction of high income households perhaps explains the higher fraction
of larger bottle sizes. Demand estimation will control for consumer income.
Table 1.8: Consumer Income Distribution


















This section develops the structural model used to evaluate the welfare impacts of
prohibiting second degree price discrimination in the wholesale market. The structural model
has three main components: wholesaler behavior, retailer behavior, and consumer demand.
16Income is reported as a series of bands. The data bellow is created by taking the midpoint of each band.
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Figure 1.2 presents the general structure of the model along with the model timing. Consu-
mers have preferences over various liquor types which generate purchases of liquor. Consumer
and retail stores are located around a limited geographic area (for example, New York State).
The spatial distribution of consumers and retailers generates variation in local demand at a
particular establishment and determines the “type” of a particular retailer. There is a single
wholesaler who knows the distribution of this local demand variation but does not know the
realization at any one location. The wholesaler engages in second degree price discrimination
by offering nonlinear price schedules to maximize expected profits, taking advantage of this
heterogeneity in local demand.17 Each component will be discussed in turn.
1.4.1 Fundamentals
Consider a monopolist wholesaler who has marginal cost cj for each product j that
faces a large number of downstream retailers who are each local monopolists. Retailers
are heterogeneous and each retailer is characterized by a vector of types λrj, one for each
product, each independently drawn from some product specific bounded distribution Fj(λrj).
Without loss of generality, I will assume that Fj(λrj) is defined on [0, 1]. In each market,
consumers generate some downward sloping market share function for each product sj(p).
The type λrj represents a local scaling of demand for a particular product at a par-
ticular retailer. For example, variation across retailers (but within a product j) might arise
from geographic dispersion of consumers, variations in the income distribution across lo-
cal markets, or variation in retail experience. The interpretation is that the type λrj is a
17Alternatively, the wholesaler knows the realization at any particular location but is prevented from
engaging in perfect price discrimination.
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Figure 1.2: Model Industry Structure
Wholesaler
Retailer 1 Retailer 2 · · · Retailer R− 1 Retailer R












local demand level that the retailer knows better than the wholesaler. That is, retailers’
know their own types while the wholesaler only knows the distribution Fj(λrj). Knowing
only the distribution of types means that the wholesaler cannot engage in first degree price
discrimination. The wholesaler therefore uses nonlinear pricing for each product to price
discriminate over this distribution.
1.4.2 Retailer Problem
Retailers are assumed to engage in monopolistic competition. (Tirole 1988) §7.2 gives
the distinguishing features of monopolistic competition as downward sloping firm demand
and negligible strategic interaction between many firms. Data on retailer specific sales in
the Nielsen Homescan Panel is limited. While the monopolistic competition assumption is
extreme in the sense that it abstracts from competition, it does incorporate retailer heteroge-
neity and double marginalization which are critical to understanding the impact of quantity
discounts in an intermediate goods industry. Further, the data to support a different assump-
tion is not available. The monopolistic assumption will induce the model-predicted retail
prices to be too low. The magnitude of this effect depends on the cross price elasticities of
the different products.
The downward sloping demand assumption amounts to assuming that retailers have
price setting power. One can assume that retailers are differentiated in some sense, certainly
by location and perhaps by retail experience or staff knowledge. In the presence of non-
negligible search or transportation costs, each retailer would have at least some price setting
power. Analysis of liquor license data indicates that there are more than 3,000 liquor stores
in the state with 1,412 liquor stores in the five counties composing New York City. Thus, the
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“many firms” clause is satisfied. Therefore, while monopolistic competition is a potentially
limiting assumption, it is consistent with the structure of the market.
The model also abstracts from any multi-product price setting concerns. The assump-
tion will be that retailers will maximize profit across products independently. Both (Conlon
and Rao 2015) and (Miravete et al. 2017) find very small cross price elasticities across spirits.
Therefore, the effect of this assumption should be relatively minor. In the discussion below,
the product subscript is suppressed.
With the above assumptions about competition and price setting behavior, the retailer
profit can now be described. Retailers face a price schedule set by the wholesaler. The price
schedule is a multi-part tariff containing a finite number of segments and can be characterized
by a series of two part tariffs consisting of a fixed fee and linear price within that segment.
Choosing to be in a segment k = 1, . . . , N−1 means that the retailer’s total cost is Ak+ρkq,
where q denotes the amount purchased by the retailer. Given that a retailer chooses to be
in a particular segment k, their profit is given by:
πr(p; ρk) = (p− ρk)s(p)λrM − Ak , (1.1)
where the retail price is denoted by p, and M represents a general demand scaling parameter
common across retailers. The presence of M allows λr to have support bounded on [0, 1].
Thus, the amount sold by a retailer is s(p)λrM . It should be noted that choosing a particular
tariff segment is dual to purchasing the amount required to fall into that segment. The
problem could be recast in terms of picking the optimal quantity given the tariff, but would
lead to the same solution.
The profit maximizing price given for a retailer choosing segment k is characterized
24
by:
(p? − ρk)s′(p?) + s(p?) = 0 , (1.2)
which implicitly defines a function p?(ρk) giving the optimal retail price as a function of the
wholesale price for that segment. Note that the optimal price does not depend on the type
λr. Therefore, all retailers in a particular segment charge the same price. All else equal,
if retailers have similar input costs one would expect them to charge similar prices. The
relatively low number of retail prices that will be charged in equilibrium is supported by the
retail data. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of unique prices observed for a product in a
month. Relatively few retail prices are observed in practice.
Though they charge the same price, profits would vary across retailers according to
variation in λr. To see this, plug in the the optimal retail price function into the retailer profit
shown in Equation 1.1. In equilibrium, the amount purchased by a retailer is s(p?(ρk))λrM
and the corresponding profit for being in that segment as:
π?r(k) = (p
?(ρk)− ρk)s(p?(ρk))λrM − Ak , (1.3)
which clearly depends on λr.
1.4.3 Wholesaler Problem
The wholesaler sells a large number of products, each indexed by j. For consistency
with the retail model, the wholesaler maximizes profit for each product independently, igno-
ring cross product effects. The product subscript is suppressed in the discussion below.
The wholesaler problem is to pick the profit maximizing price schedule with N − 1
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Limited to top 250 products observed more than once in a month.
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prices given the distribution F (λr), a constant marginal cost c, retailer behavior p
?(ρk), and
consumer demand s(p).18 F and c are assumed to be product specific.
The wholesaler has several choice variables. Conditional on the number of segments
in the price schedule, the wholesaler must choose the linear price within each segment ρk
and the associated fixed fee Ak for each segment k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Within a segment, the
wholesaler gets profit from a retailer of:
(ρk − c)s(p?(ρk))λrM + Ak . (1.4)
Recall that the retailer type parameter λr represents local demand. Assuming the
wholesaler only knows the distribution F (λr) amounts to assuming that the wholesaler
doesn’t observe local demand but may have some belief over potential outcomes.
It is important that F have an increasing hazard rate. (Wilson 1993) §8 points out
that that an increasing hazard rate is a sufficient condition for the optimal purchase size to
be non-decreasing in type. This property is satisfied by many common distributions, such
as the uniform distribution. I will assume that F is a particular family of Beta distributions
which satisfy the increasing hazard rate property. Specifically, I assume:
F (λ; b) = 1− (1− λ)b. (1.5)
This is equivalent to assuming that F ∼ Beta(1, b). Recovering te first parameter in addition
to b (while still ensuring the increasing hazard rate property) does not qualitatively change
the results of the counterfactual simulations. Figure 1.4 provides three examples from this
18The model will treat the number of segments offered as exogenous. That is, the number of prices offered
by the wholesaler will be assumed to be the number observed in the data.
27
family of distributions, the uniform (b = 1) and two others. As b increases, the distribution
becomes less heterogeneous and shifts towards zero. Allowing b < 1 shift mass towards the
high end of the distribution.










It is also important that λr enters multiplicatively in the retailer profit function. This
assumption ensures that the demand functions for retailers (i.e. the intermediate demand)
do not intersect. Retailers with a higher type will buy more at any given wholesale price.
(Maskin and Riley 1984) note that this so-called single crossing property guarantees sorting
of consumers in equilibrium. (Wilson 1993) §6 notes that sorting is crucial to ensure that
the optimal nonlinear price schedule is monotonic. Combined with the increasing hazard
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rate property, the single crossing property ensures that the optimal nonlinear price schedule
is one with quantity discounts.
Assuming that retailer demand is given by λrs(p
?(ρ))M ensures the single crossing
property and that retailer demand can be ordered by type. Retailers purchasing from seg-
ment k are those retailers with types λk ≤ λr < λk+1. These cutoff types define the quantities
at which the price schedule will change. The quantities cutoffs defined by the type cutoffs
are the model analogue of the quantity thresholds seen in Figure 1.1.
This allows us to define the profit a wholesaler expects from a segment:∫ λk+1
λk
[(ρk − c))s(p?(ρk))λrM + Ak] dF (λr) . (1.6)






[(ρk − c))s(p?(ρk))λrM + Ak] dF (λr) . (1.7)
The wholesaler’s choice variables are the prices ρk, fixed fees Ak, and cutoff types λk.
To ensure continuity of the price schedule, additional constraints must be imposed.
Intuitively, the retailer with the cutoff type should be indifferent between their assigned
segment k and the one below k − 1 (otherwise it is not a cutoff type). That is, the profit
for a retailer of the cutoff type should be the same for being in segment k or segment k− 1.
Formally, this gives the set of conditions:
(p?(ρk)− ρk)s(p?(ρk))λkM − Ak = (p?(ρk−1)− ρk−1)s(p?(ρk−1))λkM − Ak−1 . (1.8)
These conditions can be used to eliminate the choice of fixed fees from the wholesaler’s
program. The profit function can be reformulated entirely in terms prices and cutoff types.
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[(ρk − c))s(p?(ρk))λrM ] dF (λr)
+ (1− F (λk))λkM((p?(ρk)− ρk)s(p?(ρk))− (p?(ρk−1)− ρk−1)s(p?(ρk−1))) .
(1.9)
The first term represents profits from unit sales. The second term represents the profit from
fixed fees. To fix ideas further, it is instructive to consider a simple two part tariff (i.e.
N = 2). In this case, all retailers are subject to the same tariff given by A1 and ρ1. The




[(ρ1 − c)s(p?(ρ1))λrM ] dF (λ) + (1− F (λ1))λ1M((p?(ρ1)− ρ1)s(p?(ρ1))) . (1.10)
The integral term represents the profit gained from selling units to all the types participating
in the market (λr > λ1). The second term represents profit gained from the fixed fee
associated with that price, which in this case is the profit of the lowest participating type.
price. The first order conditions with respect to the price and cutoff types characterize the


















= 0 , (1.11)
−λ1f(λ1)(ρ1 − c)s(p?(ρ1)) + [1− F (λ1)− λ1f(λ1)] [(p?(ρ1)− ρ1)s(p?(ρ1))] = 0 . (1.12)
19The tariff “option” with k = 0 is considered non-participation. Not participating thus generates zero
profit for the retailer.
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For a multi-part tariff, there will be a total of 2(N − 1) first order conditions. These
first order conditions characterize the optimal prices and cutoffs for each segment. In general,


















× [λk(1− F (λk))− λk+1(1− F (λk+1))] = 0 , (1.13)
and the conditions for the optimal cutoffs are given by
− (ρk − c)s(p?(ρk))λkf(λk) + (ρk−1 − c)s(p?(ρk−1))λkf(λk)
+ [1− F (λk)− λkf(λk)] [(p?(ρk)− ρk)s(p?(ρk))− (p?(ρk−1)− ρk−1)s(p?(ρk−1))] = 0 .
(1.14)
1.4.4 Consumer Demand
Up until this point, I have assumed that consumers generate some market share
function sj(p) that describes demand for a particular product. I now describe the consumer
behavior that generates this demand function.
I follow most of the empirical industrial organization literature and derive consumer
demand from a discrete choice model of individual level product choice. The liquor market
consists of a large number of products when considered at the UPC level. To model consumer
choice across all possible products would be a daunting task indeed. As described in 1.3.2,
the empirical specification considers the most popular 250 liquor UPCs. I also include an
outside option (denoted as product “0”) which indicates choosing something other than one
of the 250 most popular products or no liquor at all.
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Each consumer i chooses a product j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 250} in month t. They get utility
Uijt defined as:
Uijt = α1pjt + α2pjt ln(
incomei
10000
) + xjβ + εijt ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , 250} (1.15)
Ui0t = εi0t j = 0 (1.16)
where incomei denotes the income of consumer i. The xjβ term represents the impact of
product characteristics on consumer utility. During estimation, these will be controlled for
with a series of product dummies. This also captures any time invariant unobserved product
attributes relevant to consumers. Unobservable (to the econometrician) components of utility
are given by εijt.
To complete the demand specification, an assumption is required on the distribution
of the unobservable components of utility. I assume that the εijt follow a Type-I extreme
value distribution such that the choice probabilities of the above model are given by a logit
model.
As described in Section 1.3.2, the Nielsen Homescan Panel provides individual level
purchase decisions. The parameters of the model can thus be estimated via maximum likeli-
hood. Identification of model parameters will come from differences in purchase probabilities
across consumers rather than across markets. (Shum 2004) provides an example of estima-
ting a similar demand system using individual level data. See (Train 2009) for a discussion
of the properties and estimation of these and related models.
One limitation of the above specification is the inability to control for product-month
specific unobserved effects. For example, an advertising campaign for Tanqueray in April is
not captured by the observables in the model. Importantly, such unobserved effects might
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be relevant for pricing decisions by firms. That is, prices may be correlated with these
product-time varying unobserved effects. This correlation between prices and unobservable
characteristics creates an endogeneity problem that must be dealt with in estimation.
The typical approach to addressing endogeneiety in discrete choice models is to imple-
ment some version of the estimation approach outlined in (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995),
(Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 2004), or other related approaches. Critical to these types of
approaches is the assumption that market share data is observed with no error. If enough
individual level data is available, individual level choices may be aggregated to get a measure
of product market share. However, the Nielsen Homescan Panel does not provide enough
individual purchases of each product in a particular month such that aggregating the indi-
vidual choices represent an accurate measure of the product market share. Therefore, such
aggregate level approaches are not appropriate given the data available.
(Petrin and Train 2010) propose an alternative approach that relies on control function
methods. Their approach is valid in individual level models that do not rely on observing
aggregate market shares. They also demonstrate that their approach provides similar results
to the aggregate level methods described above when the necessary assumptions about mar-
ket share data are valid. The control function method presents a plausible way to control
for endogeneity in the model specified above.
1.4.5 Computational Considerations
Before addressing extensions to this model, it is worthwhile to discuss difficulties
that arise in this setting. The function p?(ρ) has no closed form solution and must be found
numerically because consumer demand is derived from a logit formulation. This adds a
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computational burden to evaluating the first order conditions given above. The function
p?(ρ) enters both directly and in the form s(p?(ρ)). In general, if the consumer demand
is nonlinear then the ρk term will enter nonlinearly in the first order conditions. This
complicates the solution of the first order conditions for the optimal tariff. Finally, the
optimality conditions obtained from the above profit function include an integral term with
one of the choice variables in the bounds. Thus, unless the integral
∫
λdF (λ) has a closed
form, a closed form solution for the optimal price schedule is not possible.
The difficulties pointed out above are not prohibitive to using this framework. They
present computational rather than theoretical challenges. Solving the above framework with
functional forms useful for empirical work is possible, but necessitates numerical solutions.
Further, tight tolerances and careful techniques must be employed to ensure an optimum is
found. Appendix B discusses these issues further and details the computational approach
used in practice.
1.4.6 Extensions
The setting presented above covers most of the features relevant to measuring the
welfare consequences of preventing the wholesaler from engaging in price discrimination.
There are three main extensions to the setting presented above: including cross product
effects, wholesaler competition, and retailer competition.
The first extension is to consider pricing behavior that includes cross product effects.
This affects the above model in two ways. First, retailer price setting would depend on
the cross-price elasticities of the various products. The retailer prices would also depend on
the marginal cost of each product (i.e which segment of the price schedule the retailer is
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on for every product they sold). Second, because the retailer price setting behavior p?(ρ)
depends on all the price schedules so will the solution for the optimal price schedule for
each product. At this point, the model becomes a multidimensional screening model. While
multidimensional screening has been studied theoretically, such an approach is not feasible
for empirical work. (Wilson 1993) §14 covers such a model and provides only partial cha-
racterization. (Armstrong 1996) considers multidimensional nonlinear pricing and is able
to characterize general results for subset of models satisfying some separability conditions.
The focus of this paper is on the impact of nonlinear pricing. Including multidimensional
screening complicates the problem without addressing the fundamental question.
The second extension is to consider competition between wholesalers who set nonli-
near price schedules. (Rochet and Stole 2002), (Armstrong and Vickers 2001), and (Stole
1995) present theoretical evaluations of nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly context (primarily
with single products, only two firms, and only with completely nonlinear schedules). In
all cases, equilibria are difficult to characterize and strong assumptions such as symmetry
and full market coverage are required. The nature of these theoretical models makes them
ill-suited for empirical use. Further, these models largely focus on the single product case
reflecting the difficult nature of multiproduct competition in nonlinear pricing.
Table 1.9 presents a measure of competition between wholesalers available from the
price schedule data. The idea is to try and measure the frequency with which a particular
product is offered by a given number of wholesalers. It is important to consider the timing
aspect of this as well, as it appears that the products offered by a wholesaler change over
time. The table presents the number of product-months for which the reported number
of wholesalers offer the same product. A product is defined as a brand-size combination
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(i.e. Tanqueray 750ML). For example, if products were only offered by one wholesaler every
month, then all observations would be in the top row. Alternatively, if every month five
wholesalers all offered the same products, then all observations would be in the bottom row.
As can be seen, more than half of product-months are offered by just one wholesaler, while
almost all are offered by two or fewer wholesalers. That is, the vast majority of the time a
product is offered by only one or two wholesalers state-wide.
Table 1.9: Distribution of Number of
Wholesalers Selling a Product






The final extension to consider is competition between retailers. The model outlined
above assumes that the retail market is monopolistically competitive. Introducing competi-
tion between retailers raises a number of questions. From a consumer’s point of view, retailers
are offering essentially homogeneous products. However, retailers may be differentiated in
their “retail experience” (e.g. staff knowledge, location, the pleasantness of the shopping
environs, etc.). Modeling competition between retailers must account for two issues: con-
sumers’ preferences over retailers for identical goods, and how retailers best respond to one
another. Ultimately, retail competition models reduce to local monopoly pricing on residual
demand. The differences are in how that residual demand arises. The above model captures
variation in the residual demand through the retailer type λr.
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1.5 Recovering Parameters
The goal of this paper is to compare the welfare under a regulatory regime that allows
quantity discounts versus a regime that allows only linear pricing. There is no exogenous
policy change during the sample that would allow direct estimation of the effect of banning
nonlinear pricing. Rather, the structural model presented above can be used to evaluate how
different wholesale pricing behaviors impact welfare. The above model nests both cases of
interest; it allows for both price schedules with several options, as observed in the data, and
only linear prices (by setting N = 2 and constraining fixed fees to be zero).
I recover the parameters of the structural model (conditional on the demand speci-
fication) from the shape of the observed price schedules, schedule by schedule. While the
consumer demand system is estimated across all products, the wholesaler marginal cost,
complexity cost, and retailer distribution parameter is recovered separately for each price
schedule. Intuitively, this is similar to inverting the model to recover the parameters. This
allows the supply side parameters to vary freely across products and over time. I rely on
inequalities implied by the profit maximization behavior of the wholesaler to recover the
desired parameters. This approach exploits the rich nature of the price schedule data. With
the estimated parameters, the welfare under each regulatory regime can be compared.
There are two sets of parameters to recover: the parameters of the consumer utility
function and the supply side parameters. Consumer utility parameters are common across
consumers and products. The wholesaler model introduces product specific parameters: the
wholesaler marginal cost c, the type cutoffs λ1, . . . , λN−1, and the parameters of the distribu-
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tion of types F (λ) to be recovered.20 The retail model contains no additional parameters to
estimate. Product characteristics (including price), consumer demographics, and consumer
purchase decisions are observed from the NHP data. The fixed fees and linear prices (Ak
and ρk) can be recovered directly from the reported price schedules. Variation in consumer
purchase decisions and product characteristics allows the parameters of the utility function
to be estimated.
1.5.1 Demand Estimation
The utility model specified above implies a series of individual choice probabilities
for each product. The NHP data consists of a series of individual purchases with linked
demographic data and product characteristics. The parameters of the utility function can
be estimated via standard maximum likelihood techniques. The estimation sample consists
of all liquor purchases observed in the data as well as trips for which consumers purchased
wine but not liquor. Wine is also not sold in supermarkets and so serves as a reasonable
proxy for a consumer trip to a liquor store. Inclusion of these trips helps identify the value of
the top 250 products relative to the outside option. As noted above, the demand estimation
recovers parameters for price, a price-income interaction, and a series of product dummies
for the most popular products. These product dummies are then be projected onto product
characteristics to recover the effect of product characteristics on demand.
20To aid clarity, the product and time subscripts are suppressed.
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1.5.2 Supply Side Parameters
As discussed in Section 1.4.3, a parametric assumption was made on the distribution
of retailer types. The type distribution F (λr) was assumed to follow a restricted form of the
Beta distribution such that F (x) = 1 − (1 − x)b. This distribution is flexible and can take
a number of shapes over the support [0, 1]. This introduces one distribution parameter to
recover. Define the set of supply side parameters to be recover as θs = {c, b, λ1, . . . , λN−1}.
The type cutoffs can be directly inferred from the indifference conditions of the re-
tailer. As before, the cutoff type must be indifferent between the profit at segment k and




M [p?(ρk)− ρk)s(p?(ρk))− (p?(ρk−1)− ρk−1)s(p?(ρk−1))]
, (1.17)
One must assume that A0 = 0. It should also be noted that for all observable price schedules
A1 = 0 because there is no fixed fee just to see the offerings of the wholesaler.
21
I employ a moment inequality approach to recover the remaining parameters (c, b).
The following discussion follows the ideas of (Bajari, Benkard and Levin 2007) and (Pakes,
Porter, Ho and Ishii 2015). The required assumption is that the observed price schedules are
a profit maximizing choice by the wholesalers. Thus, at the true value of the parameters,
the observed price schedule must be more profitable than any other price schedule. Denote a
price schedule ω = {ρ1, . . . , ρN−1, λ1, . . . , λN−1} and the observed price schedule as ω0. Then
21M is calibrated to be 2,000,000 for all price schedules. This value translates to every adult over 21 in
New York State purchasing approximately 2 bottles of liquor annually - an amount close to the median value
in the data.
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the above intuition can be put formally as:
πw(ω0, N ; θ0s) ≥ πw(ω′, N ; θ0s) , (1.18)
for any other price schedule ω′, observed number of segments N , and true parameter vector
θ0s .
While the above inequality holds at the true value of the parameters, the set of
parameters consistent with the above inequalities might be larger than a singleton. That set




w(ω0, N ; θs) ≥ πw(ω′, N ; θs) ∀ ω′
}
. (1.19)
To find this set, a measure of violations of the inequality is minimized. For a particular
deviation of the price schedule ω′i 6= ω0 we can define νi as the amount of violation of the
above inequality. That is:
νi(θs) = min
{
0,Πw(ω0, N ; θs)− Πw(ω′i, N ; θs)
}
, (1.20)
where νi(θs) takes the value zero if θs is consistent with the above inequality and takes a
negative value otherwise (i.e. if the deviation price schedule generates more profit at that





The zero set of the above function is identical to the set Θs.
The above approach relies on defining a set of deviation price schedules. To see how
this is done, consider a three part tariff, consisting of two prices (ρ1, ρ2) = (6.00, 2.00) and two
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type cutoffs (λ1, λ2) = (0.20, 0.60) so ω
0 = (6.00, 2.00, 0.20, 0.60). Fix a deviation amount
of δ = .1. Then a series of deviation price schedules can be constructed by multiplying
each component of the observed price schedule by 1 + δ = 1.1. For example, employing this
process to each element of the price schedule in turn gives:
ω′1 = (6.60, 2.00, 0.20, 0.60) (1.22a)
ω′2 = (6.00, 2.20, 0.20, 0.60) (1.22b)
ω′3 = (6.00, 2.00, 0.22, 0.60) (1.22c)
ω′4 = (6.00, 2.00, 0.20, 0.66) (1.22d)
Another set of deviation price schedule can be considered by perturbing two parts of the price
schedule (i.e. multiplying two elements of ω0 by 1+δ). For example, ω′5 = (6.60, 2.00, 0.22, 0.60).
Likewise for three and four elements.
An entire other set of perturbed price schedules can be generated by multiplying
elements by 1 − δ instead, scaling down each part of the price schedule. Finally, a mixture
of scaling up and down (i.e. multiplying some elements by 1 + δ and others by 1 − δ)
can generate even more perturbations. An example of such a perturbation would be ω′6 =
(5.40, 2.20, 0.22, 0.54).
By fixing a simple scaling factor δ a large number of price schedule perturbations can
be generated. In general, this procedure can generate 32(N−1) − 1 deviation price schedules
for a fixed δ. For the purposes of the estimation, I fix δ = 0.05. To save computation costs,
I consider a random subset of 200 of these possible deviations.22
22For N = 3, this procedure generates only 80 possible deviations. I consider all 80 deviations in this case.
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The parameters {c, b} enter the wholesaler profit function nonlinearly. Thus, a nume-
rical method must be used to find the set of parameters described in equation 1.19. Following
suggestions in (Bajari et al. 2007) and (Manski and Tamer 2002), I find the set Θs by mini-
mizing Q(θs) via simulated annealing. I allow the algorithm to run for 25,000 iterations and
then take the modal value as a point estimate.23
1.5.2.1 Identification
Given the estimation strategy above, it is important to understand what variation
in the data identifies the parameters. The identification of the marginal cost and size dis-
tribution parameters are related to the shape of the price schedule itself. The wholesaler
marginal cost c will be related to the lowest price option on the price schedule. As (Maskin
and Riley 1984) point out, there is no efficiency loss under nonlinear pricing for consumers
of the highest type. For a fully nonlinear schedule, that equates to the lowest price offered
being equal to the marginal cost. With the discrete nature of the price schedules, there
will still be some difference between the lowest price option and the marginal cost c. Thus,
c must be recovered through the supply side model rather than directly inferred from the
lowest marginal price offered.
The distribution parameter, b, is related to the curvature of the price schedule, i.e. the
difference between the pricing options and where the cutoffs occur. To gain some intuition
about this identification, consider the case of a degenerate distribution of type. In this case,
retailers would be homogeneous and so no price discrimination is necessary and the optimal
23Strictly, this approach should return a set of vectors θs. In practice, most products have only one or two
estimated vectors of coefficients that are near the minimum value of the objective value function. Running
the algorithm for longer would likely generate additional points.
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tariff would only have a single price. The closer the distribution is to being clustered around
a single point, the smaller the steps between pricing options.
Figure 1.5 gives another intuitive look at how the supply side parameters impact the
optimal price schedule. The baseline assumption (given by the blue line in the figure) is
that the marginal cost is $4 and F is uniform (b = 1). Increasing the marginal cost to $8
while keeping the distribution the same shifts the entire price schedule up while keeping the
cutoffs the same (as shown by the green line). Alternatively, keep the marginal cost the same
and shifting to a more homogeneous distribution (as shown by the orange line with b = 6).
While the prices also change for this shift, the lowest price offered is still approximately the
same. Thus, price schedules with higher prices are associated with higher estimates of the
marginal cost c. Likewise, price schedules with more closely spaced (and smaller magnitude)
cutoffs are correlated with higher estimates of b (more homogeneous distributions).
1.6 Results
Estimated coefficients for the consumer demand model are given first. Recovered
parameters for the supply side model are presented second, as they are conditional on the
estimated demand system.
1.6.1 Consumer Demand Estimates
Table 1.10 presents the estimated coefficients of the consumer utility function. The
price coefficients are estimated in a first stage along with product dummies. These product
dummies are then projected onto product characteristics to recover the characteristic para-
meters. Table 1.11 presents these second stage estimates. As expected, consumers prefer
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higher proof imported liquor.
Table 1.10: Estimated First Stage Demand Coefficients
Variable Coefficient (SE) p-value
Price -.16 (0.00) 0.00
Price*ln( Income
10000
) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00
Product dummies Y
Log Likelihood -205,263.63
Critical to the model is consumer price response. This effect can be summarized
by estimated demand elasticities for each product. Table 1.12 presents summary statistics
for the estimated own price elasticities. Most of the estimated elasticities are above one in
magnitude, suggesting demand for liquor is elastic. These estimates are consistent with the
elasticity estimates presented in (Miravete et al. 2017) for Pennsylvania and (Conlon and
Rao 2015) for Connecticut. As noted previously, the estimated specification does not control
for correlation between prices and any unobserved product-month effects. However, given
that the estimated elasticities are in line with those found in Connecticut and Pennsylvania, it
appears that any endogeneity problem is of limited scope. Figure 1.6 presents distributions of
the estimated elasticities by spirit type. Note that there is substantial variation in elasticities
within a group. Further, it appears that the vodka category contains two types of products:
high and low elasticity. This likely corresponds to basic and premium market segments.
1.6.2 Supply Side Estimates
I recover product specific supply side parameters for 1,161 product-months in 2011.
Rather than focusing on the values for a particular product, I will present summary measures
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Table 1.11: Estimated Second Stage Demand Coefficients
Variable Coefficient (SE) p-value
375ML -1.14 (0.06) 0.00
750ML Omitted - -
1L 0.37 (0.04) 0.00
1.75L 1.42 (0.04) 0.00
Imported 0.38 (0.03) 0.00
Proof 0.01 (0.00) 0.00
Gin -0.90 (0.05) 0.00
Vodka -0.32 (0.04) 0.00
Rum -0.29 (0.05) 0.00
Scotch 0.17 (0.05) 0.0
Bourbon 0.42 (0.04) 0.00
Whiskey -0.25 (0.05) 0.00
Tequila -0.27 (0.09) 0.00
Other Omitted - -
Constant -3.95 (0.06) 0.00
Observations 22,479
R2 0.24
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of the parameters. This approach will help identify trends in the parameter values rather
than focusing on outliers.
The supply side estimates reflect the nature of the observed price schedules. Many
of the observed price schedules have relatively small jumps between the price options. This
is reflected in relatively homogeneous distributions of retailer type. The cost parameters are
below the lowest price offered on the price schedule, reflecting a positive markup, even for
the largest purchase quantities.
Table 1.13 presents summary statistics for the recovered parameters.24 The average
recovered wholesaler marginal cost is $14.61 per bottle. The distribution parameters are
generally quite large, reflecting distributions with very little heterogeneity among retailers.25
There is little correlation between the cost and distribution parameters.
Table 1.13: Distribution of Recovered Supply Side Parameters
Parameter Meana SDa Percentilea
25th 50th 75th
Marginal Cost (c) 14.61 9.12 7.71 12.84 18.70
Distribution Parameter (b) 35.20 8.59 31.62 39.98 39.99
a The mean, standard deviation, and percentiles represent measurements
across products. In principal, the moment inequality approach should
return a set of estimates for each parameter. For the marginal cost c and
distribution parameter b, only a point is returned in practice.
24These statistics exclude 101 of the 1,161 product-months for various reasons. Reasons for exclusion
include not moving from the initial guess during estimation, extremely small cost estimates (generally re-
covered to be less than $0.01 per bottle) and some extremely large estimates of welfare changes. These
extremely large changes are two orders of magnitude larger than the next largest estimate. These outliers
appear legitimate, but represent only two products for a total of 11 product-months.
25For computational reasons, an upper bound of 40 was imposed on the distribution parameters. Beyond
that, the assumed distributions become approximately singular and are difficult to work with numerically.
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1.7 Counterfactual Simulations
The primary purposes of developing and estimating the structural model presented
above is to evaluate the welfare impact of banning quantity discounts at the wholesale level.
To do so, the estimates presented in the last section are used to solve the model under the
observed number of price options. Wholesaler profits, average retailer profits (weighted by
type), and consumer surplus are calculated. The model is then solved again for only a single
price (N = 2) and the same numbers are calculated. By comparing the two sets of welfare
numbers, I can assess the impact of banning quantity discounts.
In general, removing quantity discounts at the wholesale level decreases overall wel-
fare. The effects on wholesalers and retailers are in line with the effects of removing quantity
discounts in a final goods market: the wholesaler loses profits; retailers benefit, though the
impact depends on their type; and effects are smaller when the distribution is more homoge-
neous. The impact on consumers is negative and roughly the same magnitude as the change
in wholesaler profits.26 Table 1.14 presents a summary of these impacts across products in
dollars per product per month.
Table 1.14: Distribution of Welfare Changes Across Products (Monthly dollars)
Mean SD Percentile
5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
Wholesaler Profit -113 165 -408 -132 -56 -25 -3
Average Retailer Profit 75 112 2 17 37 88 267
Consumer Surplus -113 164 -406 -132 -56 -25 -3
Total -151 217 -544 -177 -75 -34 -4
26The same 101 products are excluded from the following tables.
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Table 1.15 presents the same summary statistics in percentage change from the ba-
seline of allowing quantity discounts:
Table 1.15: Distribution of Welfare Changes Across Products (Percent Change)
Mean SD Percentile
5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
Wholesaler Profit -26.6 0.99 -28.2 -26.8 -26.5 -26.4 -23.7
Average Retailer Profit 31.4 1.71 28.1 30.7 32.1 32.5 32.9
Consumer Surplus -26.5 0.99 -28.2 -26.7 -26.5 -26.4 -23.6
Total -13.9 0.84 -15.7 -13.9 -13.8 -13.7 -11.8
The change in wholesaler profits declines in magnitude as the distribution becomes
more homogeneous. This is exactly what one would expect in a final goods market - the
more homogeneous the distribution of buyers, the less there is to be gained from engaging
in second degree price discrimination. Figure 1.7 presents an estimated fit line for the
relationship between the change in wholesaler profits and the distribution parameter (recall
that higher values mean a more homogeneous distribution).
The change in wholesaler profits declines in magnitude as the marginal cost increases.
Figure 1.8 shows the relationship. The magnitude of the loss declines up to a point than
plateaus. This reflects the lower profit of higher marginal cost items both with and without
quantity discounts.
The corresponding changes for retailers are generally smaller in magnitude and oppo-
site in sign. This suggests that quantity discounts increase total profits in the intermediate
tier of the industry. The wholesaler extracts more profit than is lost by the retailers by
implementing the nonlinear pricing. There are, however, a few products for which the gain
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to retailers from removing quantity discounts is larger in magnitude suggesting that total
profits increase by removing the price discrimination. These products have relatively he-
terogeneous estimated type distributions. However, there are only 55 of those products,
representing only 5% of the sample once other outliers are excluded. Thus, it is difficult to
draw strong conclusions from this subgroup.
While retailers see a profit increase on average, this hides heterogeneity among re-
tailers. Retailers who were are the upper end of the type distribution and benefiting from
quantity discounts see their input costs go up and thus profits decline. Figure 1.9 shows the
change in profit as a function of retailer type for Bacardi Superior Rum, 750ML in May of
2011. The change in profits has been scaled by the estimated type density. Retailers at the
very low end sell such small amounts that the profit changes must be small. However, as
type increases the profit change first increases and then decreases. Large retailers see profit
losses from the removal of quantity discounts. The average impact depends on the relative
sizes of these groups. This can be seen by comparing the area under the curve with positive
area representing gains to smaller retailers and negative area representing losses to larger
retailers.
The impact on consumers is through changes in retail prices. Figure 1.10 shows how
prices change with the removal of quantity discounts in the intermediate tier. The sales
weighted average price increases. The retailers with higher local demand (i.e. high type) see
an increase in costs and thus raise their prices. Smaller retailers do experience a decrease in
input costs and so decrease their prices. However, the relative market share of these smaller
retailers is not enough to outweigh the impact of the change of the large retailers. The net
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effect is an increase in the price paid by consumers.27
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Interestingly, the changes in consumer surplus show similar patterns to the changes
in wholesaler profit. Figure 1.11 shows the relationship to the distributional parameter.
Consumer surplus losses are smaller with more homogeneous distributions. Finally, Figure
1.12 shows that consumer surplus losses decline as wholesaler marginal costs increase.
The similar magnitudes and patterns of consumer surplus and wholesaler profits are
27The unweighted retail price does decrease. This would be the average price if one walked into several
retailers and took a simple average of the prices. While this is reflective of the prices available to consumers,
it is not reflective of that paid by consumers. The measurement difference is important if one were trying to
assess the impact of a policy of banning quantity discounts directly.
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interesting in that they are driven by the effects on different parts of the price schedule. That
is, the losses in wholesaler profit are due to the reduced per-unit profit for smaller purchases
on the lower quantity part of the price schedule and reduced purchases by large retailers.
On the other hand, consumer surplus losses are driven by the increase in the price for the
largest purchases at the high quantity part of the price schedule.
Given the similar patterns and magnitudes seen in wholesaler profit and consumer
surplus, it is no surprise that total welfare exhibits similar patterns. Total welfare losses are
smaller for more homogeneous distributions, higher cost products, and products with fewer
parts in their price schedules. The graphs are omitted to avoid repetition.
The important conclusion to draw from this counter factual exercise is the different
reasons for the welfare impacts in the two tiers. The story in the intermediate tier is similar
to that seen in previous work on nonlinear pricing in a final goods market - wholesalers
benefit from being able to price discriminate and charge high prices to smaller retailers.
The welfare story in the retail tier is about which retailers consumers shop at. While some
retailers see profit increases and lower their prices, the more popular retailers see input
cost increases and profit losses due to increased prices. The retailers which benefited from
quantity discounts are the more popular retailers - passing the discounts they receive on to
consumers. Removing those discounts drives consumer prices up and thus consumer surplus
down.
1.8 Conclusion
Theoretical predictions of the consequences of second degree price discrimination in
intermediate markets are ambiguous. This paper empirically evaluated a particular case
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of quantity discounts in the wholesale liquor market in New York State. I developed and
estimated a structural model of the optimal multi-part tariff which provides quantity dis-
counts. The parameters of this model are then recovered from a unique data set of wholesale
liquor price schedules. The recovered parameters are then used to evaluate a counter factual
scenario and compare welfare with and without quantity discounts.
I find that quantity discounts typically increase total surplus in an intermediate goods
context. Wholesalers benefit from being able to price discriminate against smaller purchasers.
Larger retailers benefit from lower input prices. Consumers benefit because these larger
retailers pass along the quantity discounts in the form of lower retail prices. Overall impacts
are smaller with more homogeneous retailer markets, few numbers of price schedule parts,
and higher wholesaler marginal cost.
Further work on understanding the relationship between retailer heterogeneity and
welfare changes would be valuable. The products covered in this study are estimated to have
relatively homogeneous distributions of retailers. It is difficult to extrapolate the conclusions
in this paper to contexts with a more heterogeneous retail sector.
Finally, an extension to the current paper would be to include a more nuanced model
of retailer competition over a longer horizon. The current paper considers the short term
pricing impacts of removing quantity discounts with a stylized retailer model. Over a longer
time horizon, one might be concerned about larger retailers leveraging their cost advantage
to drive competitors out of the market. Another area where this paper could be extended
is in the treatment of inventory. By ignoring inventory, the analysis precludes retailers from
taking advantage of higher quantity discounts by grouping purchases over time. Inventory
effects may be important for nonperishable products such as liquor.
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Chapter 2
Foregone Profit from Using Multipart Price Schedules
2.1 Introduction
The use of nonlinear pricing by firms is an attempt to increase their profits over
that afforded by simple single-price strategies when buyers are heterogeneous. For example,
quantity discounts serve as a way for firms to price discriminate among their customers and
extract additional rent. Economic theory predicts that the firm can extract maximum rents
by offering a completely nonlinear price schedule where a unique (marginal) price is charged
for every unit of the good sold. However, such complicated pricing strategies are rarely
employed in practice. Thus, firms are foregoing profit by employing price schedules with a
limited number of segments relative to the theoretical benchmark of a completely nonlinear
price schedule. This paper seeks to evaluate the levels of foregone profit in a particular
industry and relate those to product characteristics.
I examine the use of multi-part price schedules by liquor wholesalers in New York
State. Heterogeneity in consumer demographics and preferences across retailers generates
differences in demand across retailers. Given this downstream heterogeneity, wholesalers
can increase their profits by engaging in price discrimination and offering multi-part price
schedules.
These multi-part price schedules offer a series of price and quantity bands where price
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per unit is piece-wise constant within that quantity band. This feature is common to all the
price schedules described in my data. These multi-part tariffs are common across industries,
and examples can be readily found in industrial supplies,1 office supplies,2 and the financial
sector.3
The model developed in Chapter 1 can be used to assess the foregone profit of not
offering more segments. Wholesaler profit with the observed number of segments can be
compared to the counterfactual profit with one additional segment to measure the foregone
profit of one more segment. Further, the model can also provide an approximate value for
the theoretical benchmark profit of a completely nonlinear price schedule.
In general, I find that foregone profits are small both in absolute terms and relative to
the observed profit levels. In a similar vein, it appears that firms are capturing the majority
of theoretically available profits. That is, there is little to be gained by offering a completely
nonlinear price schedule. This suggests that firms are capturing much of the profits available
despite using simpler strategies.
I find that these foregone profits are related to some product characteristics, such as
spirit type. However, product characteristics have small effects in absolute terms. When
considering percentages, product characteristics have no impact on foregone profit. This
suggests that foregone profit depends more on the number of segments offered rather than
particular product characteristics.
(Wilson 1993) §6.4 notes that, given the same set of buyers, multi-part price schedules
1www.fastenersuperstore.com/ offers multi-carton discounts for a wide array of fasteners and screws.
2www.uline.com offers per unit discounts on many common office, janitorial, and safety supplies.
3(Copeland and Garratt 2015) detail a nonlinear price schedule for settling financial accounts.
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offer lower profits than the corresponding completely nonlinear price schedule. He indicates
that the loss relative to the completely nonlinear schedule is on the order of the number of
segments plus one squared and he goes on to show in §8.3 that this is a fairly general property
of multi-part price schedules. However, the exact deviations depend on buyer preferences
and the distribution of buyer heterogeneity. This paper seeks to complement this theoretical
work by outlining which factors contribute to large or small deviations from the maximum
obtainable profit.
Empirical work exploring approximations to optimal pricing strategies is relatively
sparse. (Chu, Leslie and Sorensen 2011) examine approximations to optimal bundling stra-
tegies in a multi-product setting of pricing theater tickets. They find that the foregone
profit from the simpler strategy is relatively small in percentage terms. (DellaVigna and
Gentzkow 2017) note that retail chains employ uniform pricing over wide geographic areas.
They argue that managerial costs prevent firms from employing the more complex (and
likely more profitable) strategy of third degree price discrimination where different prices
are charged at different stores. The current paper differs from this previous work in that it
focuses on nonlinear pricing of a single good rather than bundling or geographical variation
and examines many more products.
This paper is also related to work exploring the shape of nonlinear price schedules.
(Busse and Rysman 2005) consider smooth approximations to observed multi-part price
schedules and evaluate the effects of varying measures of competition on the shape of price




The data used to evaluate the foregone profit of offering a multi-part price schedule
is the same as that discussed in Chapter 1. Foregone profit is a function of the number of
segments offered. Therefore, the previous data discussion is supplemented with a discussion
of the number of segments offered across price schedules.
Figure 2.1 presents the unconditional distribution of the number of segments in a price
schedule. There is substantial variation over the number of segments, with most schedules
exhibiting between three and five segments. Almost no price schedules have one segment
(i.e. the wholesaler does not offer a quantity discount). The relatively low number of
segments offered is in line with theoretical predications from (Wilson 1993), suggesting that
the observed schedules capture a large fraction of the profits potentially available.
The number of segments in the price schedules is unrelated to observable product
characteristics. This suggests that wholesalers are not following rules such as “all gins have
four prices offered”, or “all 1.75L bottles have six prices.” Rather, the wholesaler decides
how many segments to offer on a product by product basis. Table 2.1 presents the results of
a Poisson regression of the number of price schedule segments on some observable product
characteristics derived from the price schedule data. These estimates are purely correlational,
but serve as a useful way to summarize the variation. The coefficients are almost all precise
zeros. The highest price, first quantity cutoff, and proof have little relation to the number
of segments. The predicted number of segments for each spirit type is approximately the
same as that for the baseline category (brandy). Likewise, bottle size has no effect, with
375ML, 750ML, and 1L bottles having approximately the same number of segments as 1.75L
products.
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Table 2.1: Poisson Regression of Number of Options on Product Characteristics
Variable Coef. SE P-Value
First Price -0.00 0.00 0.00
First Cutoff -0.00 0.00 0.00
Proof 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gin -0.11 0.01 0.00
Liqueur -0.05 0.01 0.00
Rum -0.04 0.01 0.00
Scotch/Whiskey/Bourbon -0.06 0.01 0.00
Tequila -0.16 0.01 0.00
Vodka -0.09 0.01 0.00
1L -0.10 0.00 0.00
375ML -0.17 0.01 0.00
750ML -0.15 0.00 0.00
Feb 0.05 0.01 0.00
Mar 0.04 0.01 0.00
Apr 0.03 0.01 0.00
May 0.04 0.01 0.00
Jun 0.06 0.01 0.00
Jul -0.00 0.01 0.79
Aug 0.03 0.01 0.00
Sep 0.04 0.01 0.00
Oct 0.05 0.01 0.00
Nov 0.05 0.01 0.00
Dec 0.06 0.01 0.00
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The data description offered above suggests two conclusions about the foregone profit
of multi-part price schedules in this industry. First, the wide variety in the number of
segments offered suggests that the foregone profit may vary widely across products. Second,
the fact that the number of segments is unrelated to observable product characteristics
suggests that foregone profit might also be unrelated to observable product characteristics.




The structural model used is identical to that presented in Chapter 1. Therefore,
rather than repeating the discussion presented previously, this section will provide intuition
on what model components impact the foregone profit of offering only a finite number of
segments. From the wholesaler’s perspective, there are two key features of the model: the
per unit profit from selling liquor, and the heterogeneity of the downstream buyers.
The wholesaler’s per unit profit governs the overall profits from offering a particular
price schedule. Retailers know consumer demand and make purchase decisions given a
price schedule. The price schedule determines the revenue from the quantity sold. The
wholesaler’s cost structure determines the profit gained from that revenue. Combined, the
derived demand and cost structure determine profits available at any particular number of
price schedule segments. Recall that the model’s cost structure is constant marginal cost
while the derived demand structure is based on a logit demand system.
The heterogeneity of the downstream buyers (in this case retailers) determines how
the wholesaler’s profits change with the number of segments available. At one extreme,
if buyers are homogeneous then the wholesaler cannot increase profits by offering more
than a single price (i.e. a two-part tariff). If there are a finite number of buyer types
then the wholesaler cannot increase profits beyond offering a different price to each type.
The model assumes a continuum of buyer types and so the wholesaler can increase profits
until a continuum of prices is offered (a fully nonlinear schedule). Put another way, buyer
heterogeneity determines the curvature of profits with respect to the number of segments
offered.
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The goal of this paper is to understand the shape of wholesaler’s profit with respect
to the number of segments offered and how this shape varies across products. In the model,
buyer heterogeneity is price schedule specific. The per unit profit function is common across
products, aside from the wholesaler marginal cost which is price schedule specific. Thus, if
there are patterns across products, this suggests that derived demand is relevant to the shape
of wholesaler profits. Alternatively, if buyer heterogeneity is the primary factor driving the
shape of foregone profits than we would not expect product characteristics to be particularly
relevant.
2.4 Estimating Foregone Profit
Using the model to estimate foregone profit is straight forward. Model implied profits
are calculated at three different number of segments: the observed number of segments, one
additional segment, and at an infinite number of segments (corresponding to a completely
nonlinear price schedule).4 Profits can then be compared between the three different number
of segments to gain an understanding of the foregone profits.
Formally, define the foregone profits between the observed number of segments and
one additional segment as:
ζ
N+1
= πw(N + 1)− πw(N) , (2.1)
where πw(N) is the wholesaler profit from offering N − 1 segments (i.e. an N part tariff).
While this value represents foregone profits, it also represents a lower bound on the cost of
4In practice, the profits at an infinite number of segments will be approximated with a finite but large
number of segments. For all products, 15 segments was used as the approximation point. Thus, the values
presented below strictly represent a lower bound on the foregone profits.
67
offering N + 1 segments. That is, ζ
N+1
represents the minimum complexity cost necessary
to rationalize the observed number of segments. This complexity cost might arise from
managerial decision making costs, marketing costs, operational research costs to develop the
price schedule, or other reasons.
A normalized value can also be considered to help account for different profit scaling




πw(N + 1)− πw(N)
πw(N)
. (2.2)





where πw(∞) is the profit available from offering the completely nonlinear price schedule.
2.5 Results
The foregone profit was estimated for 1,060 product months over 2011.5 Estima-
tes of foregone profits are denoted in dollars per product per month and appear relatively
small. Figure 2.2 presents summary statistics of the profit foregone profit by not offering an
additional segment (ζN+1), by the total number of segments offered.
5As in Chapter 1, these statistics exclude 101 of the 1,161 product-months for various reasons. Reasons
for exclusion include not moving from the initial guess during estimation, extremely small cost estimates
(generally recovered to be less than $0.01 per bottle) and some extremely large estimates of welfare changes.
These extremely large changes are two orders of magnitude larger than the next largest estimate. These
outliers appear legitimate, but represent only two products for a total of 11 product-months.
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As expected, the foregone profit of adding an additional segment generally decreases
as the segments offered increases. Note the dramatic decrease in level of foregone profits
between offering two and three prices. This suggests that the majority of the profits available
form a nonlinear price schedule can be obtained from just two prices. Further, there is
substantial variability within a total number of segments. This suggests that product specific
factors are likely important.
Figure 2.3 presents the normalized value of the foregone profits (ζpct
N+1
). Recall that
this is the percentage increase in current profits are available by offering an additional seg-
ment.
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In percentage terms, the foregone profit is now much less widely dispersed. It is also
extremely small. The median product offering two prices could increase profits by less than
5% by offering an additional price. This rapidly drops to approximately 1.5% when offering
three prices. Considering foregone profit in percentage terms corrects for different profit
scaling between products. Thus, the focus here is primarily on the curvature of profits with
respect to the number of segments rather than the overall level.
Relating these graphs back to the model indicates that variation in the per unit profit
across products is more important than variation in the buyer heterogeneity across products.
The foregone profit looks rather widely dispersed across products. However, once product
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specific scaling is controlled for by considering foregone profits as a percent, products look
very similar to each other.
It appears that product characteristics play some role in the foregone profits. Table
2.2 presents the results of regressing both the level and percent of foregone profits on product
characteristics and time dummies.
Which product characteristics appear important depends on whether levels or per-
centages are considered. For example, being a gin product appears to matter for levels but
not percentages. Interestingly, the percent regression explains almost all of the variation in
the data, suggesting that the curvature of profits with respect to the number of segments is
unrelated to product characteristics and is similar across products.
Comparing the profits at the observed price schedule to the maximum obtainable
profits reveals similar patterns. Recall that the maximum profits are achieved by using a
completely nonlinear schedule. The observed schedules all offer a finite number of parts and
so achieve only a portion of the total profits available.
Figure 2.4 plots the distribution of the percentage of maximum available profits over
the number of segments offered. Offering two prices obtains almost all of the profit available.
Almost 98% of the profits can be obtained with just three prices. These values are much
higher than those predicted by the theory.6 That is, simple pricing strategies obtain more
of the available profit in practice than suggested by theory.
6Recall that (Wilson 1993) suggests that foregone profits are on the order of the number of segments
squared. That approximation suggests that three prices would capture 88% of profits.
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Table 2.2: Regression of Foregone Profit on Product Characteristics
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Table 2.3 relates the percent of maximum profits to product characteristics. Product
characteristics appear to have little meaningful effect on the percent of profits obtained.
Further, the simple model captures almost all the variation in the data suggesting that
the percentage of profits obtained depends on the number of segments offered rather than
particular product characteristics.
2.6 Conclusion
In practice, firms appear not to use relatively complicated pricing strategies. Rather,
they rely on pricing strategies that are simpler, but offer lower profits than the theoretical
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optimum. This paper evaluates these forgone profits in the context of multi-part price
schedules in the New York liquor market.
This paper finds that foregone profits are small both in absolute terms and relative
to the observed profit levels. This suggests that firms are capturing much of profits available
despite using relatively simple strategies. It also appears that some product characteristics
are related to the foregone profits, such as spirit type. However, product characteristics have
small effects on the foregone profits.
Likewise, it appears that firms are capturing the majority of the profit available. That
is, there is little to be gained by offering a complex nonlinear price schedule. The percentages
obtained by a particular number of segments appear higher than those suggested by theory.
This suggests that the gains from complex strategies might be lower than previously thought.
Evaluating complex pricing strategies in other product markets would be valuable
future work. Further, trying to understand why the gains from complex pricing appear
relatively invariant to the product considered would be interesting. While nominal values
appear to vary across products somewhat, in percentage terms there is relatively little vari-




All Unit Discounts as a Price Discrimination Tool
3.1 Introduction
Nonlinear pricing takes many forms. Common types of nonlinear pricing include
quantity discounts, bundling, and free allocations. Each of these particular forms of non-
linear pricing may have different sub-types that differ in their implementation. Different
implementations of a nonlinear pricing scheme may then have different outcomes for market
participants. That is, particular forms of nonlinear pricing might be better suited to particu-
lar goals. This paper is concerned with comparing two different forms of quantity discounts
and considering how well each functions as a price discrimination mechanism.
Quantity discounts are generally characterized by marginal prices that decline as pur-
chase size grows. There are two main forms of quantity discounts - incremental unit discounts
and all-unit discounts. With incremental unit discounts, purchasers pay the marginal price
listed for each quantity size up to their desired amount. That is, the quantity discount is
applied only to the subsequently purchased units. All-unit discounts apply the discount to
all previously purchased units. That is, when the threshold for a lower marginal price is
reached, the purchaser saves on all previously purchased units as well.
On the surface, these two discount types are relatively similar. Both are characterized
by declining marginal price schedules. However, the different implementations offer different
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incentives to purchasers. For incremental discounts, buyers only need consider whether
the next marginal unit offers more marginal benefit than the marginal cost. With all-unit
discounts, the buyer must consider not only whether that next unit has more benefits than
costs but also whether the next marginal unit offers sufficient savings on previous units to
warrant a purchase. The two incentive schemes will generate different observable patterns
of purchases.
In this paper I characterize the optimal all-unit discount price schedule and compare
it to the optimal incremental discount schedule. I then compare profits and price schedules.
All-unit discounts result in lower profits for sellers. Further, all-unit discounts result in
higher marginal prices and lower purchase quantities in equilibrium. All-unit discounts better
approximate incremental discounts when consumers have lower demand on average and are
less heterogeneous. Finally, all-unit discounts generate bunching of consumer purchases in
equilibrium posing challenges for estimation of the model.
Relatively little of the literature has considered all-unit discounts directly. As a form
of quantity discounts, and thus a form of second degree price discrimination, this discus-
sion of all-unit discounts is related to previous theoretical literature focusing on nonlinear
pricing. Early theoretical work is largely concerned with finding the optimal nonlinear sche-
dule among a broad class of pricing strategies. (Spence 1977), (Mussa and Rosen 1978),
(Katz 1983), and (Maskin and Riley 1984) all take such an approach. (Wilson 1993) notes
that, under certain regularity conditions, these completely nonlinear price schedules can be
expressed as a series of two part tariffs. Such a sequence of two part tariffs is equivalent to
the incremental discounts discussed above. However, none of these previous authors have
considered implementation of second degree price discrimination through the use of all-unit
77
discounts. (Amornpetchkul 2017) notes that all-unit discounts generate different purchase
behavior than incremental discounts, but considers only a simplified two-price version of
each discount scheme.
Another branch of literature considers all-unit discounts as a method of foreclosing
competition. (Kolay Sreya, Shaffer Greg and Ordover Janusz A. 2004) present a discussion
showing that while all-unit discounts have been considered a foreclosure mechanism, they can
arise in equilibrium without that motive. They go on to show that, relative to incremental
discounts, all-unit discounts might increase or decrease welfare in a double marginalization
context. (Conlon and Mortimer 2013) examine the exclusionary nature of all-unit discounts
in an empirical setting. They find that wholesaler’s offering all-unit discounts can cause
retailers to not carry competitors’ products. The current paper differs in that it considers
all unit discounts as a price discrimination mechanism rather than a foreclosure mechanism.
3.2 Intuition
The implementation of quantity discounts as all-unit discounts or incremental dis-
counts generates different incentive schemes for buyers. This section tries to outline how
those incentive schemes differ and what the observable consequences of those differences are.
In both instances price schedules offering a finite number of segments will be considered.
That is, price schedules are given by a series of marginal prices and quantity thresholds.
Finally, there are a large number of consumers indexed by some continuous “type” θ such
that higher types purchase more at any given point.1
1This is essentially assuming single crossing property detailed in (Maskin and Riley 1984) and discussed
previously in Chapter 1.
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The primary difference in the incentives between all-unit discounts and incremental
discounts is the shape of the total payment schedules. For incremental discounts, the total
payment as a function of units purchased is always increasing. Recall that incremental
discounts only apply to marginal units, not previously purchased units. Thus, the equilibrium
price schedule is continuous and increasing in quantity. For all-unit discounts total payment
as a function of quantity purchase decreases at the quantity thresholds because the new
marginal price applies to all previous units. Thus, the total payment function will have
discontinuities at the quantity thresholds.
Figure 3.1 shows the total payment functions for a hypothetical set of incremental
discounts and all unit discounts. The marginal prices in both cases are the same, as are the
quantity cutoffs.2 Note that the all unit discount schedule contains the discontinuities where
the total payment decreases by purchasing one more unit at the quantity thresholds. This
is the discontinuity discussed above.
Also notice that the total payment is lower with all-unit discounts with the same
marginal prices. Thus, one might expect that the marginal prices would be higher under all-
unit discounts so that the seller captures some of the profit implied in the fixed fee through
the marginal prices. Thus, equilibrium purchases should generally be lower under all-unit
discounts than under incremental discounts.
Given the discontinuity in the total payment schedule, some buyers could actually
lower their total payment by purchasing more units. For these consumers, the reduction in
total cost and marginal benefit of the additional units increases their total payoff. That is,
2Cutoff q1 corresponds to the minimum purchase size the seller is willing to facilitate in both cases. In
the incremental discount case this is equivalent to setting a fixed fee in the first segment.
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for customers who optimally purchase some amount at p1 that is “close enough” to q2, they
are willing to purchase additional units beyond their optimal amount to lower their overall
cost.
Figure 3.2 depicts just such a consumer.3 Consumer θ is indifferent between buying
D(p1, θ) at p1 and q2 at p2, where D(p, θ) is the optimal purchase of type θ at price p. Note
that D(p2, θ) < q2 implying that this consumer wants to purchase less than q2 even at the
lower marginal price. However, the cost savings is high enough by moving from p1 to p2 so
that they prefer buying the “extra” units.
Figure 3.2 also shows the first consumer who’s optimal purchase is q2, i.e. type θ.
This consumer can get more for a lower total payment at p2. However, it is important to
note that q2 is the optimal purchase size for this consumer so there are no “extra” units.
Together types θ and θ define a range of types who all purchase exactly q2. For almost
3I would like to thank David Sibley for helping me to clarify the problem with a similar figure.
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D(p, θ) D(p, θ)
all of these types, they are buying more than is implied by their demand function. This
behavior will generate bunching of purchases at q2. That is, in the distribution of purchase
sizes there will be a point mass at q2. Such behavior is induced by any discontinuities in the
price schedule, thus there may be multiple bunch points in the purchase distribution.
This bunching distinguishes the purchase behavior under all-unit discounts from that
seen in incremental discounts. There is no such cost savings for buying more under incre-
mental discounts, and so there will be no bunching in the purchase distribution at the cutoff




This section describes the seller problems that define the optimal all-unit discount
and incremental discount schedules. The solution to these problems describe the equilibrium
price schedules given a consumer population.
In both cases, sellers face a heterogeneous distribution of buyers characterized by
some type θ ∼ F (θ). Without loss of generality, I will assume F has support on [0, 1].
Consumers have some utility function:
V (θ, q, p) = u(θ, q)− P (q) , (3.1)
such that P (q) is the total payment for buying quantity q and consumers with higher θ have
higher willingness to pay for a given quantity. Finally, assume the seller faces a constant
marginal cost. The seller’s problem is then to find the profit maximizing P (q) given consumer
preferences and their marginal cost.
3.3.1 Incremental Discounts
For a seller offering incremental discounts, their price schedule can be characterized
by a series of fixed fees and associated marginal prices (Ak, pk) so that the price schedule is
given by the lower envelope of the two part tariffs. Quantity cutoffs are defined by where
the applicable two part tariff changes. Formally, the seller picks a piecewise linear function
P (q) where each segment is given by:
Pk(q) = Ak + pkq . (3.2)
To enforce continuity of the price schedule, the seller is constrained in the choice of
fixed fees. As is typical in a price discrimination problem, the seller will want to ensure that
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the lowest valuation buyer in a particular segment is indifferent between that segment and
the previous.4 Formally, this gives a set of conditions:
u(θk, D(pk, θk)) − Ak − pkD(pk, θk) = u(θk, D(pk−1, θk)) − Ak−1 − pk−1D(pk−1, θk) , (3.3)
where θk is the minimum type buying in segment k, i.e. the cutoff type.
These conditions can be used to express the seller’s problem entirely in terms of prices







(pk − c)D(θ, pk)dF (θ)
+ (1− F (λk))(u(θk, D(θk, pk))− pkD(θk, pk)
−u(θk, D(θk, pk−1)) + pk−1D(θk, pk−1))
]
. (3.4)
The integral term represents the per unit profit from buyers in segment k. The second term
defines the increment in the fixed fees between segments. Implicitly, all purchasers above a
particular segment are paying the incremental fixed fee for that segment.
There are also some relevant boundary conditions. At the upper end, θN = 1 repre-
senting the highest valuation consumer. At the lower end, p0 represents not purchasing such
that D(θ, p0) = 0.
The optimal price schedule is characterized by the first order conditions of this pro-
blem. There is one first order condition for each price and each cutoff type giving a total of
4This discussion is almost identical to that seen in Chapter 1.
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2(N − 1) conditions. The optimality condition for a price pk is given by:∫ θk+1
θk
[(pk − c)Dp(θ, pk) +D(θ, pk)] dF (θ)
+ (1− F (λk)) (uq(θk, D(θk, pk))Dp(θk, pk)− pkDp(θk, pk)−D(θk, pk))
− (1− F (λk+1)) (uq(θk+1, D(θk+1, pk))Dp(θk+1, pk)− pkDp(θk+1, pk)−D(θk+1, pk)) . (3.5)
The optimality condition for the cutoff type θk is
5:
− (pk − c)D(θk, pk)f(θk) + (pk−1 − c)D(θk, pk−1)f(θk)
+ (1− F (λk)) [uθ(θk, D(θk, pk))− uθ(θk, D(θk, pk−1))]
− f(θk) [u(θk, D(θk, pk))− pkD(θk, pk)− u(θk, D(θk, pk−1)) + pk−1D(θk, pk−1)] . (3.6)
Together, these first order conditions form a system of (potentially nonlinear) equations that
can be solved for the optimal price schedule. Substituting the equilibrium prices and cutoff
types into the consumer indifference conditions defines the associated fixed fees.
3.3.2 All-Unit Discounts
For a seller offering all-unit discounts, the price schedule is defined by a series of prices
and quantity cutoffs. Formally, the seller picks a pricing function P (q) where each segment
is given by:
Pk(q) = pkq . (3.7)
5The optimality condition has been simplified by imposing the equilibrium purchase condition of consu-
mers such that uq(θ, p) = p.
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Recall that all-unit discounts generate a discontinuous total payment function and
one defining feature is that there is bunching at the cutoff quantities. Therefore, one must
define the boundaries of the set of consumers who bunch.
The lower bound on the bunching region is the consumer who is indifferent between
buying in the current segment or purchasing exactly at the quantity cutoff. Formally, for a
particular price pk and associated cutoff quantity qk, the lower bound on the bunching region
θk is defined by:
u(θk, D(θk, pk−1))− pk−1D(θk, pk−1) = u(θk, qk)− pkqk . (3.8)
The upper bound on the bunching region is defined as the consumer who’s optimal
purchase at pk is exactly qk. Formally, θk is given by:
D(θk, pk) = qk . (3.9)




purchase exactly qk. These conditions define a bunching
region for each segment.







(pk − c)qkdF (θ) +
∫ θk+1
θk
(pk − c)D(θ, pk)dF (θ) , (3.10)
s.t. u(θk, D(θk, pk−1))− pk−1D(θk, pk−1) = u(θk, qk)− pkqk ,
D(θk, pk) = qk ,
and the boundary condition that θN = 1. The constraints can be substituted into the profit
function to express the problem as an unconstrained problem. However, that approach relies
on being able to express the boundary types in closed forms.
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The first order conditions for this problem characterize the optimal all-unit discount
price schedule. The optimality condition for prices pk are given by:












[(pk − c)Dp(θ, pk) +D(θ, pk)] dF (θ) = 0 . (3.11)







(pk − c)dF (θ) = 0 . (3.12)
Combined, this gives a system of 2(N − 1) nonlinear equations that can be solved for the
optimal price schedule.
3.4 Comparison
This section calculates the optimal incremental discount schedule and optimal all-unit
discount schedule given the same set of consumers. Given the price schedules, I can compare
prices, profits, and consumer surplus to understand how the implementation of quantity
discounts matters.
Particular functional forms need to be selected to implement the above models. In
particular, a marginal cost c, type distribution F , and consumer demand D must be chosen.6.
6Choosing a demand function implies a utility function for consumers. Alternatively, one could pick a
consumer utility function which implies a particular demand.
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For the purposes of this exercise:
c = 0 , (3.13)
F (θ; b) = 1− (1− θ)b , (3.14)
D(θ, p) = θ(1− p) . (3.15)
The consumer type distribution is depends on another parameter b and is equivalent to
assuming that types are distributed according to a Beta(1, b) distribution. This parame-
ter governs the heterogeneity of the type distribution. Higher values of b shift probability
mass towards zero and correspond to lower average type as well as lower variance in the
distribution.
Given this parameterization, the optimal all-unit and incremental discount schedules
can be calculated. To better understand how the all-unit discount schedules correspond
to the incremental discount schedules, different number of segments (N) and different type
distributions will be considered. Specifically, N ∈ [2, 6] and b ∈ {0.5, 1.0, 2.0} are examined.







Table 3.1 presents the relative profit for implementing an all-unit discount schedule
versus an incremental discount schedule. In general, all-unit discounts offer lower levels of
profit than the incremental discount schedule. In a sense, the all-unit discount schedule
is a restricted form of the incremental discount schedule where the fixed fees have been
constrained to be zero for all segments. Therefore, one would expect incremental discounts
to offer higher profits.
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Table 3.1: Relative Profit of All-Unit Discounts to Incremental Discounts
Heterogeneity (b)
N 1.0 0.75 2.0
2 0.84 0.86 0.88
3 0.90 0.88 0.89
4 0.91 0.87 0.93
5 0.91 0.87 0.95
6 0.90 0.87 0.95
The relative value of all-unit discounts is higher when buyers are smaller and more
similar, as shown in the third column of Table 3.1. As consumers are on average smaller, their
purchase sizes will be smaller. The difference between the marginal prices on the incremental
discount schedule and all-unit discount schedule are not as pronounced at smaller purchase
sizes. Thus, when consumers make smaller purchases on average, the disparity between
the two price schedules is reduced. Conversely, as consumers become larger on average the
relative gain of offering incremental discounts is increased.
Finally, Figure 3.3 compares the total payments under the alternative discount sche-
dules.7 Note that the marginal prices are higher under the all unit discount schedule, as
expected. Further, the total payment is lower under all-unit discounts at the cutoff quanti-
ties, indicated by the points on the graph. Finally, note that the maximum purchase size is
lower under the all-unit discount schedule, reflecting the higher marginal prices.8
7For this figure, N = 4 and b = 1.0 corresponding to three prices and a uniform type distribution. The
results are qualitatively similar under different parameterizations.
8Given this demand specification, it is optimal to set the upper bound on the bunching ranges equal
to the lower bound on the next bunching range, i.e. θk = θk+1. This has two implications. First, the
highest cutoff quantity is equal to the maximum purchase. Second, there are no purchases not at the cutoff
quantities. This latter implication is interesting as it implies a discrete purchase size distribution despite
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of Payments Under All-Unit and Incremental Discounts
T
q
3.5 Empirical Content of All Unit Discounts
Beyond the theoretical differences between all unit and incremental discounts, it is
important to consider the observable implications of each type of discount. Data generated
from each type of discount structure will differ in important ways. This section highlights
those differences.
Consider a dataset that consists of a price schedule and purchase quantities. Given
the price schedule and quantities, purchase prices can be derived depending on the type of
discount schedule. Clearly, knowing the style of discounts is important. Quantities translate
into different marginal prices and total payments depending on whether they are all-unit
discounts or incremental discounts. For this discussion, assume the researcher knows the
type of discounts implemented.
Recall that the major distinguishing feature of all-unit discounts is bunching in pur-
a continuous type distribution. It is unclear if this is a general property of the model or of the particular
demand functional form.
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chase quantities. This bunching is absent from incremental discount schedules. That is, given
a set of purchase quantities, there should be no mass points in the distribution of quantity
for incremental discounts while there should be several mass points for all-unit discounts.
Such bunching may present problems for estimation. Given a price schedule, purchase
quantities, and total payments (either observed or derived), one could implement a version
of the nonparametric estimation technique developed in (Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim
2004).9 However, their approach relies on identifying the buyer heterogeneity distribution
from the purchase distribution. Such an approach may not be feasible given the bunching in
the quantity distribution. That is, the quantity distribution has mass points while the buyer
heterogeneity distribution does not, making nonparametric estimation more challenging.
3.6 Conclusion
The implementation of quantity discounts has important implications for what the
quantity discounts look like and equilibrium behavior. This paper compares the two most
common forms of quantity discounts: all-unit discounts and incremental discounts. All-unit
discounts are primarily characterized by discontinuous total payment function where total
payments may decline as purchases increase. This results in a bunching of purchases at the
cutoff quantities. Both these features are important for equilibrium behavior and absent in
an incremental discount schedule. Further, all-unit discount schedules see higher marginal
prices and lower profits for the seller. These differences in equilibrium behavior also have
implications for estimating the model parameters from observable purchases and payments.





Simple Example of Ambiguous Welfare Consequences
The welfare consequences of second degree price discrimination in an intermediate
goods market are ambiguous. This appendix details a simple model highlighting this fact.
Considering a simple model also provides intuition for what factors determine whether allo-
wing price discrimination increases or decreases total welfare.
Consider a single product monopolist wholesaler. The wholesaler has a marginal cost
c of producing the good. The wholesaler sells the good as an input to a large number of
retailers. Each retailer is a local monopolist who sells the single good and cannot store







λh with probability α
λl with probability 1− α
, (A.2)
and λl < λh. That is, each retailer faces either high or low local demand for the product.
Proportion α of the stores have high local demand. This definition of final consumer demand
satisfies the single crossing property. For any price, high demand markets with type λh will
sell strictly more than low demand markets with type λl.
1The retailer’s production technology transforms one unit of input into one unit of output.
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The wholesaler does not know (or cannot act on the knowledge of) the type of any
particular retailer. However, the wholesaler does know the distribution of types given by
λh, λl, and α. Therefore, the profit maximizing choice of the wholesaler is to engage in
second degree price discrimination and offer a series of nonlinear tariffs, one for each type
characterized by a fixed fee Fi and a marginal price ρi, and allow retailers to self-select among
those options. The wholesaler must account for the high type retailers “pretending” to be
the low type retailers and so must choose the tariffs to induce sorting among the retailers.









(ρl − c)(Ap?(ρl)−ε)λl + Fl
]
, (A.3)
s.t. (p?(ρl)− ρl)(Ap?(ρl)−ε)λl − Fl ≥ 0 , (A.4)
(p?(ρh)− ρh)(Ap?(ρh)−ε)λh − Fh ≥ (p?(ρl)− ρl)(Ap?(ρl)−ε)λh − Fl , (A.5)
where p?(ρi) is the optimal retail price charged by retailer facing marginal cost ρi. The first
constraint ensures that even the low demand retailers want to purchase from the wholesaler.
The second constraint says that the high type retailer profit for selecting the tariff designed
for the high type (given by Fh and ρh) must be at least as large as the profit from the high
type selecting into the tariff designed for the low type (given by Fl and ρl). This so-called
incentive compatibility constraint ensures that the retailers are sorted into the correct tariff
in equilibrium.2
2There are two additional constraints to be considered that do not bind in equilibrium and so are not dis-
cussed. There is an analogous non-negative profit condition for the high type and an incentive compatibility
condition for the low type to not want to select into the high type tariff.
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Noting that the constraints will bind in equilibrium and substituting in the expression for



































+ F ?l . (A.8)
Substituting these into the wholesaler’s problem ensures the constraints are satisfied and








































































ρ?h = c . (A.11)
The high demand markets are charged the efficient price. Low demand markets are charged
a markup over marginal cost that depends on the relative frequency of each type and the
relative size of big and small markets.
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To find the optimal price when price discrimination is not allowed, the above pro-
blem can be resolved with a single price (and fixed fee) ignoring the incentive compatibility
















(ε− 1)(αλh + (1− α)λl)
(ε− 1)(αλh + (1− α)λl) + λl
. (A.13)
The final piece to calculating total welfare is consumer surplus. Consumer surplus in





Total consumer surplus is thus given by the weighted sum:
CS = αCSh(p
?(ρ?h)) + (1− α)CSl(p?(ρ?l )) (A.15)
Given these solutions, determining whether second degree price discrimination by the
wholesaler is welfare improving or not is a matter of comparing welfare under each solution.
Clearly the welfare calculation will depend on the values selected for the parameters
A, ε, c, λl, λh, and α. To illustrate that the welfare consequences of allowing second degree
price discrimination by the wholesaler are ambiguous, it suffices to compare two particular
parameterizations of the model. Further, comparing these two sets of parameters will give
some insight into what causes the ambiguity. Table A.1 gives the two parameterizations
under consideration.
Table A.2 presents the equilibrium values for the wholesaler choice variables under
each parameterization. With relatively fewer high demand retailers, the low demand retailers
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Table A.1: Parameter Values
Scenario
Parameter Few Big More Big
Wholesaler Marginal Cost (c) 1.000 1.000
Demand Scale (A) 1.000 1.000
Elasticity (ε) 4.000 4.000
High Type (λh) 1.000 1.000
Low Type (λl) 0.250 0.250
Probability of High Type (α) 0.150 0.300
experience lower marginal prices. Correspondingly, the fixed fee is higher. Note that in both
cases, high type retailers pay more for a marginal unit and low type retailers pay less when
price discrimination is banned.
Table A.2: Equilibrium Values
Scenario
Variable Few Big More Big
High Type Fixed Fee (Fh) 0.054 0.081
High Type Marginal Price (ρh) 1.000 1.000
Low Type Fixed Fee (Fl) 0.017 0.008
Low Type Marginal Price (ρl) 1.153 1.474
Uniform Fixed Fee (F ) 0.021 0.018
Uniform Marginal Price (ρ) 1.084 1.134
Finally, Table A.3 presents the percent change in each welfare measure. Changes are
presented for the high demand markets, low demand markets, and total market separately
to help diagnose the source of the difference in the two scenarios.
As expected, the total change in wholesaler profit is negative in both scenarios. This
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Table A.3: Welfare Percent Changes
Scenario
Few Big More Big
Welfare Measure High Low Total High Low Total
Wholesaler Profit -25.73 6.01 -2.96 -45.84 51.29 -14.89
Retailer Profit 20.16 0.00 20.16 119.28 0.00 119.28
Consumer Surplus -21.52 20.16 -1.49 -31.49 119.28 -8.24
Total 0.15 -0.60
reflects the fact that the wholesaler can always do at least as well as the uniform price when
they are allowed to discriminate.
Retailer profit also increases in both scenarios. As the table indicates, this is driven
entirely by the high demand retailers. Marginal input costs increase for the high demand
retailers, decreasing the amount of the good they sell, but the related fixed declines enough
that total costs go down and profits go up. These two facts appear stable over a wide variety
of parameterizations tested.
Overall consumer surplus declines in both scenarios. However, the result of removing
quantity discounts is different depending on which market is considered. The changes mirror
those seen in the retail tier. The increase in marginal input costs to the high demand
retailers increases the resulting retail price and decreases consumer surplus. The opposite
effect happens in the low type markets. Marginal input costs decline and so the retail price
in those markets declines, increasing consumer surplus. The relative frequency of the two
market types determines if the overall change in consumer surplus is positive or negative.
The sign of the total welfare change differs between the two scenarios. This is driven
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entirely by the changes in retail profits. The sign of the welfare changes are the same in both
scenarios. However, the changes are larger in the scenario with more large retailers. The
gain to retailer profit in this scenario is large enough to outweigh the losses to the wholesaler
and consumers.
Whether total welfare goes up or down depends on the relative frequency of each
market type. Anecdotal testing indicates that the relative size of λh and λl also matters. A
more general statement would be that the change in total welfare depends on the relative
size of each market as determined by λh, λl, and α.
This simple model highlighted the fact that the welfare consequences of second degree
price discrimination in an intermediate goods market are ambiguous. The simple model
also made clear that the distribution of retailer heterogeneity (in this case heterogeneity in
demand) is crucial to understanding the sign of the total welfare change.
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Appendix B
Solving for the Optimal Price Schedule
Solving the wholesaler’s problem for the optimal price schedule is a well-defined,
but computationally intense problem. The computational challenges arise from two central
components of the model: the optimal retailer price for each segment, and the distribution
of retailer types. This appendix discusses these issues further and details the computational
approach used in solving the problem. Throughout the appendix, the product subscript is
suppressed.






[(ρk − c))s(p?(ρk))λrM ] dF (λr)
+ (1− F (λk))λkM((p?(ρk)− ρk)s(p?(ρk))− (p?(ρk−1)− ρk−1)s(p?(ρk−1))) .
(B.1)
The wholesaler picks a vector of wholesale prices (ρ1, . . . , ρN−1) and type cutoffs (λ1, . . . , λN−1)
corresponding to quantity thresholds where the price schedule changes. The first order con-


















× [λk(1− F (λk))− λk+1(1− F (λk+1))] = 0 , (B.2)
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and the first order condition for the optimal cutoff λk is:
− (ρk − c)s(p?(ρk))λkf(λk) + (ρk−1 − c)s(p?(ρk−1))λkf(λk)
+ [1− F (λk)− λkf(λk)] [(p?(ρk)− ρk)s(p?(ρk))− (p?(ρk−1)− ρk−1)s(p?(ρk−1))] = 0 . (B.3)
These first order conditions form a system of 2(N − 1) equations that describe the optimal
price schedule. In principle, this system of equations can be solved using standard techniques
for solving nonlinear equations.
Complications arise because of the presence of the optimal retail price for segment k
given by p?(ρk). If the optimal retail price cannot be found analytically, this introduces a
nested computational loop into each evaluation of the first order condition for each segment.
That is, for each iteration in the solution method for the optimal price schedule (i.e. guess
of ρk, k = 1, . . . , N − 1), a numerical method would need to be employed to find the set of
retailer prices p?(ρk), k = 1, . . . , N − 1. In the model presented in the main body of the
text, the optimal retail price is characterized by:
(p? − ρk)s′(p?) + s(p?) = 0 . (B.4)
Combined with the assumption that s(p) is given by a logit model, this implies that there
is no analytical solution for p?(ρk). Thus, in the empirical model of the paper such nested
numerical methods are required.
Using a numerical method to find p?(ρk) introduces some additional numerical error
in the calculation of the first order conditions. The numerical method used to find p?(ρk)
will be an approximation to the true value. Thus, sufficiently tight numerical tolerances on
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this inner loop must be used to ensure that numerical noise does not propagate through the
rest of the solution.
The other computational concern that arises in solving for the optimal schedule is
the presence of the integral in the ρk first order conditions. Unless the integral:∫ λk+1
λk
λrdF (λr) (B.5)
has a closed form, an additional numerical method must be employed to evaluate the integral.
There are a variety of methods to evaluate such integrals numerically. In practice, I use a
method based on quadrature. Simulation is another common method, but is more demanding
computationally. I implement a nested quadrature rule using seven nodes detailed on www.
sparsegrids.de. This rule will approximate an eleventh degree polynomial exactly. The
numerical evaluation of the integral increases the computational burden in proportion to the
number of nodes in the quadrature rule employed. There is an intrinsic trade off between
the number of nodes and the accuracy of the approximation. Using a more accurate rule in
my solution algorithm does not substantially change the results.
In additional to more computational burden (in the form of additional function evalu-
ations), the numerical evaluation of the integral results in some numerical noise. Inherently,
numerically evaluating the integral is an approximation process. When solving the system
for the optimal schedule, the numerical tolerance of the solution must account for the ap-
proximation error in the integral. Choosing a sufficiently accurate approximation for the
integral minimizes the chance that this approximation error impacts the solution results.
To summarize, requiring numerical methods to find the optimal retailer price p?(ρk)
and to approximate the integral introduces two kinds of computational problems. First,
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additional function evaluations, whether to solve the inner optimization problem to find
p?(ρk) or to approximate the integral, slows down computation. Second, these numerical
methods introduce noise into the solution. Tight tolerances on the nested solutions and
good approximations minimize the impact on the overall solution, but the “outer” tolerance
for the overall solution can be no smaller than the approximation error introduced by the
lower level numerical methods.
Setting aside the computational concerns outlined above, there is still the question
of how to actually solve the system of equations to get the optimal schedule. In practice,
I use an optimization based approach using a variation on Newton’s method. Maximizing
wholesaler profit with respect to the prices ρk and cutoffs λk for k = 1, . . . , N − 1 is a well
defined problem. The gradient is given by the first order conditions outlined above and the
Hessian is readily calculated.
Most multidimensional numerical optimization methods are local in nature and re-
quire a starting guess to initialize the algorithm. The efficiency of the numerical algorithm
and perhaps the ability to even converge to a solution depends on how close the initial guess
is to the actual optimum. Poor starting guesses lead to slow convergence or no solution.
In practice, I tried several approaches for picking starting values before settling on
a continuation-based approach. I considered an approach based on linearizing the model
as well as using several thousand iterations of a global solution method as other methods
for choosing starting values. In practice, these approaches appeared inferior in terms of
convergence time and stability to the continuation based approach described here.
In the continuation based approach, I solve the sequence of optimal tariffs for Ñ =
102
2, . . . , N and use the solution for Ñ as the starting values for Ñ + 1. For example, to find
the optimal schedule with six prices (N = 7) requires finding the optimal tariff for one price,
two prices, three prices, etc. The optimal price and cutoff for the single price solution are
used as the starting point for the two price schedule. The solution for the two price schedule
is then used as the starting point for the three price schedule and so on.
In practice, this continuation based approach serves to provide stable numerical so-
lutions for many prices and for a wide range of wholesaler parameters (the marginal cost c
and distribution of types F ). The solution for single price option appears to be relatively
insensitive to the starting guess. Thus, this chain of solutions can reliably calculate the
optimal solution for any number of price (i.e. any N) without being affected by the star-
ting guess. It is, however, computationally demanding as the optimization problem must be
solved repeated for every intermediate number of prices between one and the desired number.
In conclusion, the solution algorithm for and N part tariff is given below. Starting
with Ñ = 2 and some initial guess at a single price and cutoff:
Step 1: Find optimal price schedule for Ñ using Newton’s Method.
Step 2: If Ñ = N , take result as optimal price schedule. Else, continue to Step 3.
Step 3: Take resulting optimal price schedule consisting of optimal prices ρ?k and op-











Step 4: Set new starting guess to ρ?1, . . . , ρ
?
Ñ−1, ρÑ and λ
?
1, . . . , λ
?
Ñ−1, λÑ .
Step 5: Increase Ñ by one.
Step 6: Go to Step 1.
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